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THE PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY
Grant Gilmore *
For many years it has been recognized that a present security interest
may be established in property to be acquired by the debtor in the
future. When the subsequent acquisition is in turn financed by a
purchase money transaction the question arises whether the lien of
the original mortgagee or that of the purchase money creditor has
priority. Professor Gilmore traces the historical priority given the
purchase money interest, the areas in which the priority has been
qualified, and the embodiment of the priority in the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act. He then describes some of the solutions and
raises some of the problems presented by Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, discussing the Code's treatment of the pur-
chase money interest in inventory, collateral other than inventory,
and fixtures. He concludes by urging that defects in the Code be
repaired in a uniform and careful manner rather than ignored or
denied through fear that such repair would hinder general adoption
of the Code.
I. PURCHASE MONEY INTERESTS, FLOATING LIENS
AND ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A NOTABLE feature of the development of our personal
property security law over the past hundred years has been
the progressively greater recognition of long-term security in-
terests in all the assets of a borrowing enterprise, whether owned
by the borrower when the loan is made or subsequently acquired.
We have passed from wholehearted acceptance of the self-
evident proposition that a man cannot transfer property he does
not own - qui non kabet, ille non dat - to a somewhat grudg-
ing acceptance of the much less evident proposition that, for
reasons which are no doubt sufficient even though they are rarely
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articulated, a business enterprise should be allowed to make an
irrevocable commitment, for the benefit of its present creditors,
of all its future property. As a matter of history, however, the
triumph of the after-acquired property interest has been regularly
followed by an important limitation or qualification. The after-
acquired interest, wherever it has been recognized as valid against
the borrower's creditors and in his bankruptcy, has been sub-
ordinated to subsequent purchase money interests which arise in
connection with the financing of new acquisitions by the borrower.
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code codifies both the
triumph and the limitation. No previous security statute has so
warmly embraced the once-despised after-acquired property in-
terest. It is also true that no previous statute has so sternly in-
sisted on the priority for purchase money interests.
Article 9 has often been referred to as a "floating lien" stat-
ute.' In this country floating lien is a term more often used in
scorn or anger than in praise, although in England and Canada it
has long been respectable for liens to float.' It is surely true that
under the Article 9 provisions a secured party may take a security
interest which "floats" over all of his debtor's present and future
1 Presumably the "floating lien" description is a shorthand reference to a
series of provisions in Article 9:
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective ac-
cording to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors" (9-201). With limited exceptions as to crops and consumer
goods, "a security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired,
shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement" (9-204(3)). "Obliga-
tions covered by a security agreement may include future advances or other value
whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment" (9-204
(5)). "A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors" by rea-
son of the debtor's being given liberty to sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral
without being under any duty either to account for proceeds or to replace col-
lateral (9-205). And a security interest shifts automatically to the proceeds of col-
lateral (9-306) (with limitations on the secured party's interest in proceeds which
need not presently be explored).
2 See Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203, 251-59 (1959), for an inter-
esting comparison of the English floating charge and the Article 9 floating lien.
The reference in the text should not be taken to mean that the English floating
charge is the same thing as an Article 9 security interest which takes full advan-
tage of the floating lien provisions. Coogan and Bok point out that, under
English law, the holder of a floating charge may be subordinated to unsecured
creditors until the charge has "crystallized" (which is usually done through the
appointment of a receiver). The authors conclude that "although the floating
charge thus appears in many ways to be a second-rate security, its wide use would
indicate that creditors find it a useful device despite its risks." Id. at 254-55.
Among the English literature on the subject, see GowFR, MODERN Co TPAN " LAW
389-93 (2d ed. 1957); WALDocK, MoRTGAGES ch. 7 (2d ed. 195o); Pennington, The
Genesis of the Floating Charge, 23 MoDEN L. Rav. 63o (ig6o).
HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:13331334
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1334 1962-1963
PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY 1335
assets. It is possible for a term loan to be secured by whatever
assets may happen to be lying around at the time of default, with-
out any requirement of policing by the secured party or of ac-
counting by the debtor during the loan period.' On one or an-
other theory such a transaction was invalid under all the pre-
Code security devices, with the possible exception of transactions
within the scope of some of the factor's lien acts and some of the
accounts receivable statutes passed in response to Corn Exch.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder.4
This aspect of Article 9 is its most controversial feature. The
case against the floating lien, insofar as it does more than rely
on the authority of precedent and the accumulated wisdom of the
past, consists principally of two points: i) the availability of a
floating or blanket lien on all present and future assets will leave
nothing to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors and will
consequently tend to dry up the sources of such credit; 2) the
law should protect a necessitous borrower against himself by re-
fusing to allow him to encumber all the property he may ever
own in order to secure a present loan. Defenders of the Article
(the present author is one) no doubt bear the burden of proof.
Their case, as it has been most often expounded, rests not so much
on the merits or the positive excellence of the floating lien as on
an argument of fait accompli.
The position taken in defense is that under one or another of
the many available security "devices" it has long been possible
to encumber all a debtor's present and future property with valid,
enforceable liens. To do so under pre-Code law was cumbersome,
expensive and tricky; only the most expert lawyers could hope to
avoid the many hidden pitfalls. But it could be done. The old
rules had demonstrably broken down. The crumbling of the ini-
tially well-defined judicial position of hostility to anything re-
sembling a floating lien must be taken as sufficient proof that
commercial needs, entitled to protection, required the abandon-
ment of a state of the law appropriate only to a more primitive
stage of industrial development. The old rules, insofar as they
have any surviving vitality, merely penalize legitimate trans-
actions and serve as traps for the unwary and the unskilled. It is
pointless to go on pretending that things cannot be done which in
fact and law can be done. The floating lien should, therefore, be
'Section 9-2o5 (see note I supra) is an express repealer of the rule of Benedict
v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (X925).
4 3 I8 U.S. 434 (1943).
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recognized as valid and then cut down to size in situations where
its unlimited and unrestricted application might lead to undesir-
able or unjust results.
There is general agreement that it would be unfortunate if
creditors in Code states took to securing any extension of credit
by placing a blanket lien on all the debtor's assets. Critics of the
Article argue that this will in fact happen and that no one will be
safe in extending unsecured credit. In this connection it may be
pointed out that if a secured creditor is allowed to claim $50,000
worth of assets in his debtor's insolvency proceeding, that is be-
cause at some time he contributed $5o,ooo to the now insolvent
estate. The law of fraudulent conveyances, decisional and statu-
tory, remains in effect to invalidate conveyances for other than a
fair consideration and the law of voidable preferences to invali-
date transfers by insolvents shortly before bankruptcy. And, if
the reader will forgive the statement of an elementary proposition,
when a $i,ooo loan is secured by $ioo,ooo worth of assets, the
secured creditor gets $i,ooo, not $ioo,ooo. The observation may
also be ventured that, quite apart from Article 9, it is unsafe to
extend unsecured credit today, if the debtor's insolvency before
repayment is assumed. The records show that most estates ad-
ministered in bankruptcy are eaten up by expenses of administra-
tion and other priorities (particularly those in favor of state and
federal taxes) established by the Bankruptcy Act. It has been
true for many years that an unsecured creditor stands to get very
little or nothing if his debtor fails. This gloomy thought does not
seem to have restricted the supply of unsecured credit. Article 9
at least gives creditors who provide the working capital for an
enterprise the opportunity to protect themselves against the de-
vouring monster of the statutory priorities. Nevertheless, we may
concede that it would be unfortunate if every ten-dollar creditor
took a blanket lien to secure his claim. At the very least this
would be an unmitigated nuisance. There is no advantage in
taking unnecessary security or in oversecuring a loan where some
security may be appropriate. In operating under Article 9, a
lawyer's duty may well be taken to include the task of educating
his clients to act in accordance with these rather obvious proposi-
tions. There has not yet been enough experience in states where
Article 9 is in effect to justify a prediction as to the outcome of
this vexed question.
The Article 9 position is that, while the floating lien (if that is
the proper designation) should be recognized as valid, appropriate
limitations should be written into the statute to avoid unjust re-
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sults. Of these limitations, the most important is the priority con-
ferred on purchase money interests.;
A recurrent problem in the life history of an enterprise is how
to provide for the financing of new equipment free of prior liens.
The new equipment may be needed because the business is ex-
panding or shifting to a new line of production or because new
inventions have made the old equipment obsolete or because the
old equipment has simply worn out. A prior mortgage contains an
after-acquired property clause to which the new equipment will
be subject. Where bonds have been issued under a corporate
mortgage, it will be impossible to procure the assent of the scat-
tered bondholders to a subordination of their lien, so as to make
the new financing feasible. It might be argued that as a matter
of justice and morals the prior mortgagee or the bondholders
ought not to be subordinated without their consent. However that
may be, the law's answer has been to provide some more or less
complicated method of effecting the subordination. Under pre-
Code law, this was most often done by a manipulation of title
theory under the system of separate security devices. Most of
the specialized devices were recognized as giving the security
holder title and not "merely" a lien: this was true of the condi-
tional sale, the security lease (which was the basis of the rail-
road equipment trust in the version known as the Philadelphia
Plan), and the trust receipt. The way of defeating the prior
mortgagee, recognized as effective under pre-Code law, was to
have the security holder's title to the new equipment come directly
from the manufacturer or seller. Thus, conceptually, the title to the
equipment never vested in the mortgagor and the lien of the prior
mortgage had nothing to bite on.
A solution of this sort was impossible under Article 9, because
the Article not only destroyed the system of independent security
devices but also refused to recognize any distinction between
"title" security interests and "lien" security interests.6 Never-
'For the purchase money priority under Article 9, see Parts IV-VII infra.
Other limitations on the floating lien may be briefly mentioned. The effectiveness
of an after-acquired property clause is severely limited where the collateral is
crops or consumer goods (9-204(4)). On disposition of collateral, the secured
party's interest shifts to the proceeds received by the debtor, but, in an insolvency
proceeding, the right to recover proceeds which have been deposited in a debtor's
bank account is limited to the amount of proceeds which have been received by
the debtor during the period of ten days preceding the institution of the insol-
vency proceeding (9-306(4)). A "new value" status is denied to out-of-ordinary
course acquisitions and to acquisitions not made within a reasonable time after
new value has been given to enable their purchase (9-io8).
S"Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies
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theless, the result achieved under the pre-Code law was recog-
nized as sound. The problem was handled as one of priorities and
solved by the introduction of the concept of the "purchase money
security interest."
There is much less novelty in Article 9 than meets the eye and
most of that novelty is a mere matter of terminology. To under-
stand what the Article is getting at, it is frequently helpful to set
it in its historical perspective. In the following discussion we shall
therefore review the .development of the interrelated problems of
the after-acquired property interest and the purchase money
priority as they have presented themselves in various financing
contexts. Our historical inquiry, which will be inescapably some-
what lengthy, will, it is hoped, throw some light on the Article 9
provisions which will then be reviewed in detail.
II. THE RAILROAD CASES
A. The New Orleans Railroad Case: Priority of
the Purchase Money Interest
In 1858 and i86o the New Orleans and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany executed mortgages which purported to cover all the com-
pany's property presently existing and to be thereafter acquired.
Some years later the United States, which had become the holder
of bonds issued under the mortgages, instituted proceedings which
led to a decree of foreclosure and sale of the railroad's property.
It then "transpired [according to the statement of facts in the
litigation as it reached the United States Supreme Court] that a
portion of the rolling stock, consisting of two locomotives and ten
cars, had been sold to the railroad company by the United States
in 1866, and that, simultaneously with the sale, the company
gave to the United States a bond for the purchase-money, where-
in it was stipulated that the latter should have a lien therefor
upon the property sold . . . ." Upon this apparently belated
discovery of its special interest in the two locomotives and ten
cars, the United States, ceasing to make common cause with its
fellow bondholders and their trustee, insisted that the "said
locomotives and cars" should not be included in the property put
up at the foreclosure sale. The "solicitors" for all parties agreed
and the marshal was directed to set the locomotives and cars aside.
The rest of the property was sold but brought less than the
amount of the bonds. The court then proceeded to a determina-
applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor" (9-
202).
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tion of the priorities between the United States, as holder of the
purchase money bond, and the bondholders claiming under the
after-acquired property clauses of the mortgages. It appeared
that the bond given for the purchase money had never been re-
corded and that its contents were unknown to any of the bond-
holders "except Mr. Trimble, the trustee of the mortgages." (Mr.
Trimble had joined with the United States in instituting the fore-
closure proceedings; the report of the case in 12 Wallace leaves
the reader with the odd impression that Mr. Trimble, perhaps
through forgetfulness, had not mentioned the purchase money
bond to anyone until just before the marshal was about to sell the
locomotives and cars along with the rest of the property.) The
foreclosure court determined that the United States had a "su-
perior equity" under the purchase money bond and "made a de-
cree to that effect" (presumably that the locomotives and cars be
turned over to the United States). This decree came on appeal to
the Supreme Court, where it was unanimously affirmed. Justice
Bradley wrote:
The appellants contend . . . that the decision upon the facts
was erroneous; that the mortgages, being prior in date to the bond
given for the purchase-money of these locomotives and cars, and
being expressly made to include after-acquired property, attached
to the property as soon as it was purchased, and displaced any
junior lien. This, we apprehend, is an erroneous view of the doc-
trine by which after-acquired property is made to serve the uses
of a mortgage. That doctrine is intended to subserve the pur-
poses of justice, and not injustice. Such an application of it as is
sought by the appellants would often result in gross injustice. A
mortgage intended to cover after-acquired property can only
attach itself to such property in the condition in which it comes
into the mortgagor's hands. If that property is already subject to
mortgages or other liens, the general mortgage does not displace
them, though they may be junior to it in point of time. It only
attaches to such interest as the mortgagor acquires; and if he
purchase property and give a mortgage for the purchase-money,
the deed which he receives and the mortgage which he gives are
regarded as one transaction, and no general lien impending over
him, whether in the shape of a general mortgage, or judgment, or
recognizance, can displace such mortgage for purchase-money. And
in such cases a failure to register the mortgage for purchase-money
makes no difference. It does not come within the reason of the
registry laws. These laws are intended for the protection of sub-
sequent, not prior, purchasers and creditors.7
7 United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 US. (12 Wall.) 362, 364-65 (z871).
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The New Orleans Railroad case has been stated in detail and
quoted from at length in respectful tribute to a now long-forgot-
ten monument of our jurisprudence. It was a great case in its day.
And there may be food for thought in the reflection that the
mighty structure of the railroad equipment trust -lawyer's law
at its best- rested on the shaky foundation of the amateurish
bond for purchase money devised by some anonymous govern-
ment clerk in the process of disposing of surplus Civil War rolling
stock and that, in the excitement of the foreclosure proceeding,
the bond itself was apparently forgotten until the very last
minute.8
Justice Bradley cites no authority for the basic proposition
which seemed to him to determine the priorities, that: "A mort-
gage intended to cover after-acquired property can only attach
itself to such property in the condition in which it comes into the
mortgagor's hands." Nevertheless, the idea that a purchase
money interest prevails over antecedent claims against the vend-
ee or his property has venerable roots: a standard authority on
mortgages traces it back to a case decided in i631 and to Lord
Coke's Commentaries on Littleton.9 The doctrine in its early
stages seems to have been applied to protect the purchase money
lienor against judgment creditors of his vendee and against claim-
ants of dower, curtesy, community property and the like. The
traditional rationalization of the doctrine in the real property
field was the delightful idea of transitory or instantaneous seisin:
The idea is that title shot into the grantee and out of him again
into the purchase money mortgagee so fleetingly - quasi uno
"The classical early discussion of the railroad equipment trust is found in
Rawle, Car Trust Securities, 8 A.B.A. REP. 277 (1885). According to Rawle,
"The earliest instance of a car trust of the kind now commonly found was one
created by the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company of Pennsylvania in i868,
known as the 'Railroad Car Trust of Philadelphia.' The idea originated in the
mind of the president of the company, Mr. Edward W. Clark, and its legal details
were worked out by the late Charles Gibbons, of the Philadelphia bar." Id. at 277-
78. In a note Rawle remarks that "the germ of the modern idea of a car trust"
can be found in a series of transactions by which, starting in 1845, the board of
managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company financed the acquisition of equip-
ment (canal boats, barges, and, later, rolling stock). Id. at 322. The Lehigh Trust
of 1868 was thus contemporaneous with the foreclosure proceeding of the New
Orleans Railroad, which reached the Supreme Court in 187o. Rawle cites the New
Orleans case as having "decided" the priority of the purchase money interest over
the lien of the earlier mortgage, id. at 3o6, but does not suggest that the case (in
its earlier stages) was known to Mr. Gibbons. The Schuylkill Navigation Com-
pany's transactions did not come into any litigation which raised the priority
question.
9 OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 558 n.37 (1951).
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flattu, in one breath, as it were -that no other interest had time
to fasten itself to it.10
However rationalized, the doctrine could not come into play in
the precise situation which now concerns us -priority of the
purchase money interest over an earlier perfected security in-
terest in the debtor's property as a whole - until our legal sys-
tem had evolved to the point of recognizing a full-fledged, per-
fected or legal interest in property acquired by the debtor sub-
sequent to the date of the mortgage or other security transaction.
Once such an interest is recognized, the priority problem follows
almost as a matter of course. The reason why our priority prob-
lem first appears in the railroad equipment cases, and for a
generation or more seemed to be exclusively a problem of rail-
road finance, is that the railroad mortgage was the first important
type of security transaction in which American courts, and sub-
sequently American legislatures, were induced, by the logic of
circumstance, to recognize such an interest in after-acquired
property. For present purposes it is enough to say that the ma-
jority (although by no means universal) rule in nineteenth cen-
tury American jurisprudence had come to be that the mortgagee's
interest in after-acquired property was "merely equitable" -
that is to say, in modern terminology, unperfected - until the
mortgagee, by some new act (taking possession of the property or
filing a supplemental mortgage with respect to it), had caused
his interest to "ripen" into a legal interest, had (as we should
say) perfected the interest. Under such a state of law, the
priority of the purchase money interest over the "merely equi-
table" or unperfected claim of the earlier mortgagee went without
saying. The question would not become one worthy of judicial
concern until the after-acquired property interest had, in some
context, flowered as a legal or perfected interest.
B. Pennock v. Coe: The After-Acquired Property Interest
Ten years before the New Orleans Railroad case, the United
States Supreme Court had given the weighty stamp of its approval
to the idea that the special needs of railroad finance required that
railroad mortgages (unlike other mortgages) should extend auto-
matically to the railroad's after-acquired property. The argu-
ments of counsel, as set out in the report of Pennock v. Coe," give
1°Od. at 557-58. Professor Osborne comments that "Such a theory breaks
down in lien states where the fee remains permanently in the grantee-mortgagor."
" 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117 (IS6o).
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an idea of the novelty and difficulty of the case. Mr. Otis, for
the mortgagees, started by conceding that the law was against
him: "For the purpose of this argument, I am willing to admit it
to be the general rule of the common law, that nothing can be
mortgaged which is not in existence and does not belong to the
mortgagor at the time the mortgage is executed." 12 However, he
went on, it was clear from the authorities that "this rule is
founded solely upon a technicality," "the rule of the civil law is
the very reverse of that of the common law," and "courts
of equity which are not trammelled by the technical rules of the
common law . . . both in England and in this country, uphold
such mortgages .... ,, 13 It was enough to argue that the in-
terest should be upheld by courts of equity. The validity of the
interest would normally come up in foreclosure, thought to be an
equitable proceeding, but the procedural situation in Pennock v.
Coe showed that any proceeding, however commenced, could be
brought into equity: Pennock was a bill filed by the mortgage
trustee to enjoin the execution of a judgment recovered "at law"
by creditors of the railroad. 4 The creditors had levied on some
of the rolling stock, acquired after the date of the mortgage, and
had advertised it for sale. The Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed a lower court decree which had "perpetually enjoined"
the sale. "[W]e are satisfied," wrote Justice Nelson, "that the
mortgage attached to the future acquisitions, as described in it,
from the time they came into existence"; thus the mortgage had
a "superior equity" over the claims of the judgment creditors.
In an interesting comment, which suggests that the Court was en-
tirely aware of the economic realities with which it was dealing,
Justice Nelson added: "There are many cases in this country con-
12 Id. at 121.131d. at 122-23. The leading American authority on the validity of the after-
acquired property interest "in equity" was Story: Mitchell v. Winslow, I7 Fed.
Cas. 527 (No. 9673) (C.C.D. Me. 1843); 2 EQuIT JuRIsPaunExcE H 1040,
o4o(b), io55 (4th ed. 1846).
14 The "judgment creditors" were themselves the holders of bonds issued under
a second mortgage, junior to the mortgage for whose benefit the injunction pro-
ceeding was brought. At this early stage in the development of corporate law,
it seems to have been assumed that individual bondholders could bring suit on de-
fault and on recovery of judgment have an aliquot share of the corporation's
assets devoted to payment of their claim. In the Pennock case the holders of the
first mortgage bonds seem to have decided to avoid a foreclosure action and to
secure a declaration in the injunction proceeding that all the railroad's property,
whenever acquired, came under the lien of the first mortgage. Justice Nelson re-
marked that "the whole of the property mortgaged is insufficient to satisfy the
bondholders under the first mortgage . .. . 2 ' 64 US. (23 How.) at 131.
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firming this doctrine, and which have led to the practice extensive-
ly of giving this sort of security [i.e., mortgages with broad after-
acquired property clauses], especially in railroad and other
similar great and important enterprises of the day." '" The de-
cision in Pennock v. Coe evidently commended itself to the spirit
of the times; not only did the state courts follow the lead of the
federal courts but many state legislatures put the issue beyond
doubt by enacting statutes which liberally validated the after-
acquired property interest in mortgages issued by railroads, tele-
phone and telegraph companies, and other public utilities. 6
The sequence of Pennock v. Coe and New Orleans Railroad
established the validity of the after-acquired property clause in
certain types of industrial mortgages and the priority of sub-
sequent purchase money interests over the mortgage claim. It
was clear from the beginning that the purchase money priority
was not dependent on the particular dress in which the pur-
chase money transaction happened to be clothed. Justice Bradley
had formulated the idea broadly in New Orleans Railroad: the
after-acquired property interest "can only attach itself to such
property in the condition in which it comes into the mortgagor's
hands. . . . It only attaches to such interest as the mortgagor
acquires . . . 2" It made no difference whether the purchase
money lender reserved "title" to the property (as under a con-
ditional sale) or claimed under a purchase money mortgage or
was entitled under some more or less informal arrangement (such
as the "bond for purchase money" in the New Orleans Railroad
case) to a "vendor's lien," express or implied.17 Nor did it make
any difference whether the purchase money interest itself was (as
we should say) perfected: "[I] t is even held-that if the property
comes into the hands of the mortgagor subject to a lien which is
good against him, though, for want of formalities, it is not good
against his subsequently attaching creditors and third persons,
it is nevertheless prior to the lien of a mortgagee under an after-
acquired property clause." "I Finally, the purchase money lend-
15Id. at 130.
'"See 3 GL-m', MORTGAGES § 423 (1943).
17 Rawle, supra note 8, at 307.
'"Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 90 Fed. 322, 328-29 (6th Cir. 1898)
(Taft, C.J.). Justice Bradley had remarked in the New Orleans Railroad case
that "a failure to register the mortgage for purchase money makes no difference.
It does not come within the reason of the registry laws. These laws are intended
for the protection of subsequent, not prior, purchasers and creditors." 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 362, 36S (1870).
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er's priority was not affected even by the fact that his interest
was evidenced by a transaction clearly invalid (except between
the immediate parties) under applicable state law.19 We have
used the term "lender" to describe the holder of the purchase
money interest: despite some dubiety in the early cases it had be-
come reasonably clear by the end of the century that the priority
could be claimed either by a vendor (or his assignee) or by one
who had merely put up the money to finance the purchase.2 °
C. Limitations on the Purchase Money Priority
If the purchase money priority, thus broadly conceived, had
been allowed to flourish without limitation, the manipulators of
corporate securities would have had a first-rate device for the
easy and convenient defrauding of the holders of senior securi-
ties. The first mortgage bondholders would learn in the course of
insolvency proceedings that the original property, on the faith of
which they had bought their bonds, had been gradually dissipated
and that all the replacements and expansions had come in subject
to paramount purchase money obligations. The courts, no doubt
obscurely aware of the possibilities of unfair dealing which the
early cases opened up, in time developed a series of what might be
called equitable limitations to the doctrine of purchase money
priority.
One limitation operated against the claims of the directors, the
management, or others in a close or confidential relationship to
the mortgagor corporation. Although the opinions did not often
use language of fiduciary obligation, the holdings were unmis-
takably clear that insiders could not take advantage of their posi-
tion to vault over the heads of their existing security holders: they
were under a duty to conclude transactions between themselves
and the corporation in such a way that the lien of the existing
mortgage would not be displaced; a failure on their part to carry
out the duty was a species of fraud which would subordinate their
claims, in form entitled to the purchase money priority, to those
of the bondholders. The cases never went to the length of declar-
ing that directors and other insiders were incapable, in a good
faith transaction, of acquiring paramount claims, but the courts
were careful to scrutinize transactions in which the purchase
1" See, e.g., Myer v. Car Co., 102 U.S. 1 (i88o) (Iowa conditional sale); Fos-
dick v. SchalI, 99 U.S. 235 (1879) (Illinois conditional sale).
20Cf. Rawle, supra note 8, at 3o7; Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., go Fed.
322, 329 (6th Cir. x898) (Taft, C.J.).
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money obligations ended up in the hands of those who were
thought to be under a duty to protect the bondholders.2 '
It was a characteristic of nineteenth century judicial technique
to attack unfair transactions indirectly rather than directly. Fol-
lowing this approach the courts learned, in balancing equities be-
tween mortgages and purchase money interests, to be quite techni-
cal about what constituted a purchase money claim; the purchase
money priority, a modern commentator concluded, "can be as-
sured.. . . only if a carefully limited, and sometimes seemingly
arbitrary, procedure is observed." 22 To rank as purchase money,
a claim must be, it was often said, "directly" related to the ac-
quisition of the property. If on some theory "title" to the prop-
erty vested in the mortgagor at any point, free of encumbrance,
then the lien of the mortgage took hold and could not be dis-
placed. Rawle speculated that if a railroad company built its own
rolling stock "without a previous contract under which the
trustee of the car trust association agreed to provide the necessary
funds for that purpose, the property might be held to pass, as
soon as completed, under the operation of the 'after-acquired'
clause in a prior mortgage." 23 And although a lender as well as a
seller could be entitled to purchase money rank, there must be
satisfactory proof that the funds advanced were in fact applied
to the purchase. As Chief Judge Taft put the matter in an ex-
haustive opinion in Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co.:
When ...that which is given the appearance of a vendor's or
purchase-money lien is really only a device to secure money bor-
rowed for other purposes of the mortgagor than the buying of the
addition in question, then the attempt to supplant the first lien of
the mortgage under the after-acquired property clause is a fraud
upon the mortgage, and the pseudo purchase-money lien must be
postponed to that of the mortgage.24
Another limitation on the purchase money priority was hinted
at in the early cases but never became clearly defined. Taft's
language in the Youngstown Bridge case is once again instruc-
tive. The priority of the purchase money claim, wrote Taft,
21 See, e.g., McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536 (1892); Venner
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., go Fed. 348 (6th Cir. 1898).
22 Note, Defeating the Priority of an After-Acquired Property Clause, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 474, 477 (1935). See also Note, Priority of Purchase-Money Mortgages, 29
VA. L. RFV. 491 (1943).
23 Rawle, supra note 8, at 3o7.
24 90 Fed. 322, 329 (6th Cir. 1898).
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is not a fraud upon the mortgagee, or a violation of any right of
his, in any case where the mortgagor is under no affirmative ob-
ligation to the mortgagee to acquire additions to the property, or
to acquire them free of lien.
25
This remark, taken by itself, seems to say, or to come close to
saying, that a clause in the mortgage which put the mortgagor
under an "affirmative obligation" to acquire future property
"free of lien" would be effective not merely between the parties
(so as to make the acquisition of property subject to a purchase
money interest a default under the mortgage) but against a
subsequent purchase money claimant (at least if he had notice of
the clause), whose claim would now be a "fraud upon the mort-
gage," a "pseudo purchase-money lien." That such an interpre-
tation would go well beyond Taft's meaning is made clear by a
later passage in his opinion:
There is a clear distinction between the obligations of a mortgagor
under a mortgage in which the property described as mortgaged,
though definitely described, is yet to be bought and constructed,
and the obligations of one under a mortgage in which the property
described as mortgaged is in existence as a completed thing, and
the after-acquired property clause is inserted only to increase the
original security.
2 6
The "clear distinction" is that the purchase money priority is
recognized in the second class of cases (mortgage of a going
enterprise, where the after-acquired property clause is inserted
"only to increase the original security") but not in the first where
the mortgage itself might be regarded as a kind of purchase money
obligation, given to finance the original construction of the rail-
road, factory, or what not. In such a case, Taft continues, "the
mortgagor is impliedly bound to buy and complete the thing
mortgaged as described, and bring it under the lien of the mort-
gage, without burden or incumbrance." 7 The suggestion that
25 Ibid.
2 6 1d. at 329-30.
" Id. at 33o. Taft cites Wade v. Railroad Co., 149 U.S. 327 (i893), and Venner
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 90 Fed. 348 (6th Cir. x898). Youngstown Bridge
and Venner were decided by the Sixth Circuit on the same day, Taft and Lurton
sitting on both cases. Venner (see note 2r supra) was essentially a case in which
the taint of fraud denied an insider a purchase money priority. Taft's citation of
it in this context indicates how the several "limitations" on the purchase money
priority, which we have separated for discussion, in fact overlapped and coalesced.
The idea that the original construction mortgage cannot be subordinated to the
claims of suppliers and furnishers seems to originate in the first crop of railroad
mortgage cases, the mortgages having been given to secure funds advanced for the
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there are certain types of mortgages which, at least in certain
types of situations, do not run the normal risk of subordination
to subsequent purchase money interests is one which never quite
emerged as a clearly defined "rule." No doubt the idea came to
seem less important as the case of the "original construction mort-
gage" itself became less frequent. We shall have occasion, never-
theless, to revert to this shadowy ghost of an idea in our sub-
sequent discussion.
D. "Loose Property" and "Permanent Structure"
The early, frequent, and indeed repetitious cases of railroad
insolvencies may well have impressed the courts with the desir-
ability of preserving something for the holders of the first mort-
gage bonds. The Supreme Court accomplished this by limiting the
purchase money priority to acquisitions of rolling stock. This
limitation was foreshadowed in Galveston R.R. v. Cowdrey,28 a
colorful case in which English bondholders were introduced to the
rough-and-ready ways of Texas financiers. In the Galveston case
one Pulsford, who had furnished the rails with which five miles of
the road had been constructed, sought to have the Court declare a
"first lien" in his favor on that portion of the road, with priority
over the bonds. In explaining why Pulsford was not entitled to
priority, Justice Bradley referred to the "inflexible rule" of the
common law by which "whatever is affixed to the freehold be-
comes a part of the realty . . . The rails put down on the
company's road became a part of the road. .... Pulsford, by al-
lowing his property to go into or become part of the road, con-
sented to its being covered by the mortgages in question." 29 In
the New Orleans Railroad case, which squarely established the
priority of the purchase money interest over the after-acquired
property interest, Justice Bradley reaffirmed the distinction be-
tween rolling stock and the railroad's other property:
Had the property .. .been rails, as in the case of the Galves-
ton Railroad Company v. Cowdrey, or any other material which
became affied to and a part of the principal thing, the result would
have been different. But being loose property [i.e., locomotives and
cars], susceptible of separate ownership and separate liens, such
liens, if binding on the railroad company itself, are unaffected by
purpose of "building and equipping" the railroad. See, e.g., Galveston R.R. v.
Cowdrey, 78 U.S. (ii Wall.) 49 (,87), discussed in the text following note 28
infra.
28 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 459 (1871).
29 Id. at 482.
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a prior general mortgage given by the company, and paramount
thereto.30
Subsequently the Court made clear that the bondholders' priority
as to the "permanent structure" of the railroad would be pre-
served, no matter what form of arrangement might be adopted be-
tween the railroad and its suppliers. In Porter v. Pittsburg Besse-
mer Steel Co.,3 it appeared that the Smith Bridge Company had
constructed bridges for the Chicago and Great Southern Railway
Company under contracts which provided that the bridges should
remain the property of the Bridge Company until paid for and
that, on default, the Bridge Company should have the right to
remove the bridges. "[I] t is well settled, in the decisions of this
court," Justice Blatchford wrote, "that rails and other articles
which become affixed to and a part of a railroad covered by a
prior mortgage, will be held by the lien of such mortgage . . . as
against any contract between the furnisher of the property and
the railroad company, containing stipulations like those in the
contracts in the present case." 32
It was not clear, and it never became clear, whether the nine-
teenth century Supreme Court cases were announcing a rule of
federal law, not subject to displacement by inconsistent state law,
or whether a state statute, adopting a different approach, would
have been allowed to prevail. The question was never clarified be-
cause the Court's resolution of the priority problem was, ap-
parently, satisfactory to all concerned and became the established
pattern for railroad finance. The "permanent structure" of the
road was preserved as security for the bondholders; the rolling
stock - "loose property" in Justice Bradley's phrase - came in
subject to purchase money priority under one or another variant
of the railroad equipment trust. In time a special theology or
metaphysics was invented to explain the peculiar priority enjoyed
by equipment trust obligations: a basic tenet of dogma was that
the "equipment trust" was a device whose use was restricted to
the financing of railroad equipment, or, perhaps, transportation
equipment in general. We need not confine our thought within
such narrow bounds: wherever the all-embracing mortgage has
successfully established itself, the purchase money priority prob-
lem has received approximately the solution which the Supreme
Court devised for it in the railroad context where it first appeared.
3o 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 365.
311 22 U.S. 267 (1887).
3 2 Id. at 283.
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III. INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT FINANCING (HEREIN
OF THE DOCTRINE OF FIXTURES)
Through the second half of the nineteenth century the use of
mortgages with broad after-acquired property clauses seems to
have spread from railroads to public utility companies and in time
to manufacturing corporations which were in no way "affected with
a public interest," as the public interest was then conceived. On
the whole, nineteenth century law had been hostile to the after-
acquired property interest. However, when the issue presented
itself in the context of a corporate indenture of trust, securing
widely distributed bond issues, the courts tended to assume, on
the analogy of the railroad cases and without much discussion of
theory, that the bondholders were entitled, in insolvency pro-
ceedings and against the claims of creditors, to the corporate
property whenever acquired. 33 This relaxed handling of a tricky
problem was made easier by the fact that the federal courts were
the preferred forum for the debate, in equity receiverships and in
proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Starting with
Justice Story's celebrated decision in Mitchell v. Winslow, 4 the
federal precedents had been much more hospitable to the after-
acquired property interest than the precedents in most states.
In those pre-Erie days, the federal courts did not, in questions of
general commercial law, have to look too nicely to what the high-
est state court had said or might be expected to say. The corpo-
rate mortgagee's interest in after-acquired property came to be an
accepted thing, at least as to subsequently acquired equipment and
machinery. In general the courts held the line as to inventory and
receivables and in time the draftsmen of corporate mortgages
abandoned the attempt to include such fluid items in the security
for the bondsY. As to the equipment, indeed, it was frequently
" Cases of the period are collected in 4 Coox, CORPaORA 1ONS § 857 (7th ed.
1913); 2 MACHMN, COR0RoATONS § 1854 (1908).
34 17 Fed. Cas. 527 (No. 9673) (C.C.D. Me. 1843).
" Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (,907), offers a
relatively late example of a corporate mortgage secured both by inventory and by
fixed equipment. The mortgage was held invalid against the mortgagor's trustee in
bankruptcy as to the inventory. "No question is raised," said the court, "as to the
lien of the mortgage upon machinery, tools and appliances . . . ." After Benedict
v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), the inclusion of inventory or receivables along
with fixed assets in the mortgage security became perilous in the extreme. A
recognized feature of the Benedict rule, which required the security holder to
"police" the affairs of his borrower, came to be that a failure to comply with the
rule as to part, even an infinitesimal part, of the security invalidated the entire
transaction. See Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. xg3o), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 547 (X932).
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easy to say that no recognition of an after-acquired property in-
terest was technically involved; the equipment, on installation in
the factory, might well itself have become real property under
the doctrine of fixtures and would thus, as "accessions," come
automatically under the lien of the mortgage.
A. Holt v. Henley: The Railroad Cases Adapted
We have seen how an apparently acceptable resolution of con-
flicting interests was arrived at in the railroad industry: the
''permanent structure" of the road indefeasibly reserved to the
bondholders, the rolling stock available for separate financing with
purchase money priority. Thus the bondholders received a degree
of protection while the railroads could finance their new equip-
ment purchases free of the mortgage. It is in the nature of rail-
roading that the "permanent structure," once built, continues in-
definitely in existence; the principal need for large capital ex-
penditures after the original construction of the road is for new
and better rolling stock. Thus the judicially-devised solution left
the railroads free to carry out programs of modernization without
interference from the bondholders, while, at the same time, the
equitably inspired limitations on the purchase money priority held
in check, to some degree, the natural tendency of insiders to appro-
priate to their own use the security pledged to the bonds.
This ingenious solution could not, without alteration, be made
to fit the pattern of the industrial, particularly the manufacturing,
corporation. In the life history of the typical industrial enter-
prise, there is nothing which corresponds to the "loose property"
- the rolling stock - of the railroad. Once the enterprise has be-
come a going concern, what has to be replaced is the machines
and other fixed equipment - because old machines have worn
out, because more efficient processes have been invented, or be-
cause the enterprise, being successful, wishes to increase its pro-
ductive capacity. By the turn of the century it had come to be
agreed that the lien of a mortgage could be made to encompass
these later additions to the plant. The next problem for decision
was, inevitably, that of priority: could the new equipment be
brought in free of the mortgage? At this point the railroad cases
seemed to present a roadblock: the new equipment, once it had
been built into the factory, did not in the least resemble "loose
property"; it looked for all the world like part of the "permanent
structure." If so, under the railroad precedents, the lien of the
mortgage would be paramount over the purchase money interest.
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When the priority issue was brought to the United States Su-
preme Court the mortgagee's argument from the railroad cases
got nowhere. Since the spokesman for the Court was Justice
Holmes, the mortgagees received their dusty answer, not in
closely reasoned argument, but in crisp epigram whose literary
quality they may have failed to appreciate. Holt v. Henley 3' in-
volved priorities between a mortgagee and the conditional seller
of a sprinkling system which had been installed in the plant of the
Williamsburg Knitting Mill Company. The time sequence was un-
usual in that the conditional sale agreement was executed (by the
seller, Holt, on August 28, i909, and by the buyer, the Mill
Company, on October 14, I9O9) before the mortgage (which was
dated November 23, I9o9). However the installation of the
sprinkler system was not begun until December x9o9, and was
completed in the following March. It does not appear from the
Supreme Court's opinion whether the mortgagees, at the time the
mortgage was executed or at the time they put up their money,
were aware of the existence of the conditional sale agreement with
Holt covering the sprinkler system. Justice Holmes remarked
briefly that, "as the mortgage deed was executed before the
sprinkler system was put in and the mortgagees made no advance
on the faith of it, they were not purchasers for value as against
Holt." " The system consisted of a fifty-thousand-gallon tank on
a steel tower bolted to a concrete foundation and of pipes which
connected the tank with the mill; clearly, under the doctrine of
fixtures, the sprinkler system was "attached to the freehold" and
had become realty. The mortgage, in any event, contained an ap-
propriate after-acquired property clause. Certainly, on the anal-
ogy of the Supreme Court's railroad jurisprudence, the mort-
gagees should have won. However, said Holmes:
To hold that the mere fact of annexing the system to the freehold
overrode the agreement that it should remain personalty and still
belong to Holt would be to give a mystic importance to attach-
ment by bolts and screws. . . . "[T]he mortgagees take just such
an interest in the property as the mortgagor acquired; no more no
less." Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235.38
Consistently with the railroad cases, Holmes held irrelevant the
fact that Holt had failed to file or record his conditional sale con-
tract (a Virginia statute made an unrecorded conditional sale
386 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
37 Id. at 640.
3 Id. at 641.
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contract void against lien creditors and subsequent purchasers).
The validity of the mortgage, including the after-acquired prop-
erty clause, was assumed without discussion. Since Holmes was
not purporting to overrule the railroad cases which had restricted
the purchase money priority to "loose property," as against "per-
manent structure," he rephrased the distinction, translated into an
industrial context, in this way:
The system was attached to the freehold, but it could be removed
without any serious harm . ..other than the loss of the system
itself. Removal would not affect the integrity of the structure on
which the mortgagees advanced. . . .The case is not like those
in which the addition was in its nature an essential indispensable
part of the completed structure contemplated by the mortgage.
The system although useful and valuable can be removed and the
works still go on.3
9
Shortly after Holt v. Henley and at the same term of court, a
second case gave the Supreme Court, with Holmes again writing
the opinion, further opportunity to explain how broad a rule of
purchase money priority the Holt case was meant to stand for.
Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co.4° involved
tanks, fixtures, and fittings which had been installed in a brewery.
According to Holmes, "the tanks were essential to the working of
the brewery, and after they were installed the opening into the
recess in which they stood was bricked up." "It may be assumed,"
Holmes added, "that they became part of the realty . .. .
Could these tanks be the "essential indispensable part of the
completed structure" to which, Holmes had said in his Holt
opinion, the rule of purchase money priority did not apply? No,
said Holmes, repeating from the earlier opinion the line, which
evidently pleased him, about the "mystic importance" of "bolts
and screws":
The cases to which the possible exception left open in Holt v.
Henley applies are principally those in which the property claimed
has become so intimately connected with or embodied in that which
is subject to the mortgage that to reclaim it would more or less
physically disintegrate the property held by the mortgagee; e.g.,
Porter v. Pittsburg Bessemer Steel Co., 122 U.S. 267....
39 Id. at 64o-41.
40 233 U.S. 712 (1914). In the course of an action to foreclose the first mort-
gage, the conditional vendor had filed a "bill in equity" which prayed that the
foreclosure sale be enjoined and the petitioner permitted to remove his property.
It appears that the petitioner had offered to reimburse the mortgagee for any
damage done by him in removing the property.
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When the obvious destination of an article is to be incorporated
into a structure in such a way that to remove it would destroy the
other work, like bricks or beams in a building, there is . ..
ground for not giving to title [i.e., the purchase money interest] an
absolute right of way.41
Thus, the conditional seller was entitled to tear down the brick
wall and remove the tanks, whose presence was "essential to the
working of the brewery."
B. A Federal or State Priority Rule?
The sequence of Holt and Detroit Steel could have left no doubt
that the Supreme Court had committed itself, in the context of
manufacturing plants, to an extremely broad rule of purchase
money priority and to a corresponding diminution in the security
of mortgagees. The distinction between "essential" and "non-
essential" parts of the structure, suggested in Holt, becomes
merely a "possible exception" in Detroit Steel, limited (if it
exists at all) to "bricks or beams in a building." The two cases
were less clear on an issue which had been left ambiguous since
the days of the railroad cases: was the rule of the New Orleans
Railroad case, of Fosdick v. Schall, and, now, of Holt v. Henley
and Detroit Steel, a rule of federal law or would it give way to in-
consistent state law? The brewery in the Detroit Steel case was
located in West Virginia. Counsel for the mortgagees argued that
West Virginia was a state which did not recognize purchase money
priority in chattels which became fixtures (this, said counsel, was
the "Massachusetts rule") and also suggested that even the
limited purchase money priority which the Supreme Court had
recognized in the railroad cases reflected the fact that the early
railroad cases had come up from states which followed, not the
Massachusetts rule, but the contrary "New York rule." 42
Holmes took note of counsel's argument in the concluding para-
graph of his Detroit Steel opinion. The West Virginia cases, he
suggested, were not as clear as counsel thought they were; it was
therefore unnecessary for the Court to decide what it would do
if it appeared clearly that West Virginia law gave a mortgagee
"' Id. at 7x7. The Porter case, which Holmes cites, was one of the railroad
cases which had limited the purchase money priority to the "loose property," hold-
ing specifically that the mortgage bondholders had priority over the claim of a
conditional seller of bridges which he had constructed for the road. See p. 1348
supra.
42 See 233 U.S. at 713 (argument of counsel).
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priority over a subsequent purchase money interest in fixtures.48
Counsel in Detroit Steel had also argued that the purchase money
interest yielded to the mortgage when the mortgage itself had
been given to finance the construction: "The mortgagees . . .
contemplated the future acquisition of tanks from some source.
The Cooperage Company, when it furnished the tanks, contem-
plated that they were putting into the plant something that would
make it a complete brewery, and an integral part thereof." "
Holmes did not deign to notice this point in his opinion, which
suggests, for what it is worth, that the developing rule of purchase
money priority in this context was to be less limited than the rule
that had been worked out in the railroad cases.
By 1920 it had become familiar learning that the lien of a mort-
gage, claimed under an after-acquired property clause or under
the doctrine of fixtures (or, as was usually the case, under both),
was in general subordinate to the purchase money interest in
equipment subsequently furnished to the enterprise, even when
the equipment was affixed to the realty. There were said to be a
few minority or "Massachusetts rule" jurisdictions which denied
the purchase money priority as to fixtures, but according to the
author of a learned A.L.R. annotation, the Massachusetts rule
was gradually losing ground, in part, as he expressed it, because of
"the movement toward an equitable tempering of the rigor of the
maxim, 'quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit.' " 45
The railroad priority problem had been worked out principally
by the federal courts under the superintendence of the Supreme
Court. Except in the railroad cases, which were long looked on as
sui generis, the federal courts did not have a monopoly; for a long
period, both before and after the passage of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, the priority issue was most often presented in state court
foreclosure actions. As a result, instead of the one clear stream of
federal jurisprudence, we find much apparent diversity of ap-
proach. At a later period, it is true, the federal courts took a pre-
dominant role as the priority problem came to be litigated prin-
4 3 Holmes, however, citing Burgess v. Seligman, zo7 U.S. 20 (1883), hints
broadly that even with a state rule squarely opposed the Supreme Court would
follow its own rule of purchase money priority.
44 233 U.S. at 715 (argument of counsel)'. See discussion of Harris v. Youngs-
town Bridge Co., p. i34s supra.
45 Annot., 13 A..R. 460 (1921). The case annotated was Beatrice Creamery Co.
v. Sylvester, 65 Colo. 569, 179 Pac. 154, 13 AL.R. 448 (1919), holding that an
unrecorded purchase money interest in silos had priority over a preexisting mort-
gage on the land on which the silos were built. Subsequent annotations on the
subject are at 73 A.L.R. 755 (X931); 88 A.L.R. 1324 (1934); ii A.L.R. 372
(1937); 141 A.L.R. 1288 (1942); x9 AJ,.R.2d X300 (1951).
HARVARD LAW REVIEW IVol. 76:1I3331354
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1354 1962-1963
PURCHASE MONEY PRIORITY
cipally in bankruptcy and reorganization; by this time, however,
the federal courts had been bound to state law precedents by Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins,46 and Justice Holmes's suggestion in Detroit
Steel that priority might be a rule of federal law bore no fruit.
The Supreme Court itself made no significant contribution to the
priority question after the two 1914 cases previously discussed.
C. The Minority or Massachusetts Rule
The existence of a "minority rule" under which the truth of a
proposition which is apparent to most courts is stubbornly denied
by a few is always a matter of interest. Not infrequently an in-
vestigation undertaken in an appropriate spirit of skepticism will
reveal that the so-called minority rule does not exist at all (in
holdings as distinguished from dicta) or that the minority cases
all involve a factual variant which is not present in the majority
cases or that accident rather than design has led some courts to
accept a deviant formulation. The state of law in a minority rule
jurisdiction is apt to appear confused and inconsistent. This is
not surprising, since the courts in such a jurisdiction find them-
selves in the position of saying one thing while they are doing the
opposite, of paying lip service to a rule which exists only to be
avoided, of building up artificial distinctions and legal fictions.
The usual fate of a minority rule is to fade away and be forgotten
although occasionally it meets a more instant end at the hands of
court or legislature. In the process of decay such a rule can cause
a considerable amount of discomfort in the host state.
The "minority rule" which denied the priority generally ac-
corded to the purchase money interest in fixtures was associated
with Massachusetts. The rule in Massachusetts was usually
traced back to Clary v. Owen,1 which involved water wheels and
machinery installed in a mill; the mill was subject to a mortgage
which antedated the agreement under which the water wheels were
furnished. Judge Hoar wrote:
[I]t is contended that the mortgagor being in possession, and
having agreed with Burghardt [the seller] that the wheels should
remain the personal property of the builder until they were com-
pleted and provision made for paying for them, the wheels, having
been set up under this agreement, could not be claimed and held by
the mortgagee.
If this position were tenable, it would follow that the mort-
463o4 U.S. 64 (1938).
" Si Mass. (iS Gray) 522 (s86o).
1963] 1355
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1355 1962-1963
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
gagor could convey to another a right in the mortgaged premises
greater than he could exercise himself. . . [W] e think it is not
in the power of the mortgagor, by any agreement made with a third
person after the execution of the mortgage, to give to such person
the right to hold anything to be attached to the freehold, which as
between mortgagor and mortgagee would become part of the
realty.
48
The passage quoted is unquestionably a categorical denial of the
purchase money priority with respect to goods which, having been
"attached to the freehold," "become part of the realty." The facts
of the case were, however, curious. The contract price for the
water wheels was $3,500, of which $500 was paid in advance. The
seller began work but before the installation had been completed
the mill was destroyed by fire. The millowner then abandoned the
mill. The seller, without completing the contract, retained the
$5oo but never demanded payment of the balance or attempted
to repossess his property. The mortgagee foreclosed and himself
purchased the mill in its damaged state. After all this had hap-
pened, the seller failed and his "assignee in insolvency" brought
an action against the mortgagee for conversion of the water
wheels. It may be doubted that the most convinced judicial ad-
vocate of purchase money priority would have given judgment
for the assignee.
In our quest for the origin of the "minority rule" we thus come
upon a species of historical accident: an odd case, no doubt
properly decided on its facts, with a quotable passage in the
opinion which stated an extremely broad proposition. The sub-
sequent development of the "Massachusetts rule" was aided by a
railroad case which involved a claim for priority over a mortgage
by a furnisher of rails.4 9 In holding for the mortgagee, Judge
Foster remarked: "Nor do we suppose that a mortgagor in pos-
session is competent to bind existing mortgagees by any arrange-
ment to treat as personalty annexations to the freehold." 10 We
have seen that the United States Supreme Court reached the
same conclusion as the Massachusetts court with respect to pur-
chase money claims for rails.5 When, however, the Supreme
Court reconsidered the priority issue in an industrial context, it
had found no difficulty (speaking through Justice Holmes of
4 8 Id. at 524-25.
" Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 (1867).
5 0 Id. at 283.
" Galveston R.R. v. Cowdrey, 78 U.S. (ii Wall.) 459 (i871), discussed p. 1347
supra.
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Massachusetts) in giving judgment for the purchase money in-
terest in equipment affixed to realty and essential to the operation
of the plant. The Massachusetts court, having lost the services
of Holmes' nimble mind, fared less well. It became the cus-
tomary ritual for the court to start by announcing that "the
general rule enunciated in Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray, 522, is that all
property added to real estate after a mortgagee has acquired his
title thereto inures to him except in cases where it is otherwise
provided by agreement or by statute." 52 Having satisfied the
ritual the court would then look around, in an appropriate case,
for an escape; the most usual was a finding that the goods fur-
nished by the purchase money claimant had not become fixtures,
and in time Massachusetts law became notable for the extraor-
dinary subtlety of the distinction between fixtures and per-
sonalty.5 3
The Massachusetts court applied the rule of Clary v. Owen
that is, held the purchase money interest subordinate - prin-
cipally in cases in which the purchase money claimant had sup-
plied fixtures or equipment to a building in course of construc-
tion, the mortgage itself having been given, almost contempo-
raneously with the purchase money agreement, to secure funds ad-
vanced to enable the construction to be carried out. 4 These
cases reach the same result as many of the federal cases which are
thought to exemplify the majority rule.r5 We may conclude that
the results of the "minority rule" in Massachusetts were not sub-
stantially different from those arrived at in "majority rule" states.
The principal difference was that Massachusetts had more priority
22 Waverly Co-op. Bank v. Haner, 273 Mass. 477, 480, 173 N.E. 699, 700 (1930).
Compare Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., 97 Mass. 279 (1896) (rails furnished to
a railroad are fixtures: mortgagee wins over purchase money claimant), with
Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk & B. St. Ry., X87 Mass. 500, 73 N.E. 646 (igo5)
(rails furnished to street railway company not fixtures: purchase money claimant
wins over mortgagee).
" See, e.g., Waverly Co-op. Bank v. Haner, 273 Mass. 477, x73 N.E. 699 (1930)
(mortgage, October 4; conditional sale of plumbing and heating equipment to
new building, October ii, delivery of the equipment having been made between
October 4 and 8); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth Mortgage & Loan
Co., 276 Mass. 335, 177 N.E. 88 (931) (new apartment building; construction
loan mortgage dated February 12; conditional sale of refrigerators dated May I7).
" See Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., 90 Fed. 322 (6th Cir. 1898) dis-
cussed p. 1345 supra; Tippert & Wood v. Barham, i8o Fed. 76 (4th Cir. igio),
where the court declared it was adopting the "Massachusetts rule," in circum-
stances that, the opinion explicitly states, weighted the equities in favor of the
mortgage bondholders, whose money had been advanced to develop the water
company by the acquisition of new property. The conditional vendor of water
pipes lost to the mortgage trustee.
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litigation of this type than did most other states. The court itself
seems to have been not entirely happy with the subtlety of some
of the distinctions which it had been obliged to make. Thus we
find the court commenting in 1931:
The bald physical facts in the case at bar do not differ in
essential particulars from those in [other cited cases] ....
Whatever inconsistencies may appear between these several cases
and the case at bar are superficial and not substantial, resting
wholly upon different findings of essential facts and not resting in
any degree upon different rules of law. . . . The governing prin-
ciples of law are the same; the conclusion as to the facts may
vary.
5 6
The volume on Massachusetts litigation makes one thing abun-
dantly clear: the rule of Clary v. Owen did little or nothing to
discourage purchase money financing of equipment installed in
mortgaged property.
57
D. Section 7 and "Material Injury to the Freehold"
In the "majority rule" states the priority of the purchase money
interest over the preexisting mortgage (whose lien is asserted
under an after-acquired property clause or under the doctrine of
fixtures) is conceded. The question then becomes how broad the
rule of purchase money priority is to be, what factual variants
will reverse the priorities. Even Justice Holmes in Detroit Steel
had conceded that there were some accessions to the freehold
which went to the mortgagee over the purchase money claimant,
56 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Commonwealth Mortgage & Loan Co., 276 Mass.
335, 340-41, 177 N.E. 88, 90 (I93i).
57 The Massachusetts cases are reviewed in Coogan, Security Interests in Fix-
tures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1319, 1325-26 (1962).
Mr. Coogan comments that
In Massachusetts, removal is permitted if the goods are considered to have re-
mained personal property despite the affixation.... The equities of the in-
dividual case are often of great influence, and this factor may make it very
difficult to predict whether or not particular property remains personal. For
example, in Carpenter v. Walker, 140 Mass. 416, S N.E. 16o (1886), the
master found that a 5,6oo pound engine, which was belted to shafting, cleated
to the floor, and too large to go through the existing doors of the shed which
housed it, remained personal property and could be removed by a chattel
mortgagee. Holmes, J., seemed surprised at this conch sion, but did not up-
set it.
Id. at 1325 n.13. For the later views of Holmes after his translation from Massa-
chusetts to a larger scene, see Holt v. Henley, p. 1351 supra and the Detroit Steel
case, p. 1352 supra. The Massachusetts legislature eventually (1943) passed a
statute (repealed with the enactment of the Code) which removed specified types
of equipment from the rule of Clary v. Owen and thus allowed the normal pur-
chase money priority to be achieved without resort to the prestatutory ritual.
For the text of the statute, see Coogan, supra at 1325 n.i3.
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although he seems to have felt that this category was limited to
the "bricks or beams in a building." "
The distinction between accessions which could be financed
with purchase money priority over a mortgage, and those which
could not, came to be phrased in terms of whether or not fixtures
could be severed from the real estate and removed without caus-
ing "material injury to the freehold." Section 7 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, picking up this formulation from earlier
cases and statutes, provides:
If the goods are so affixed to realty, at the time of a conditional
sale or subsequently as to become a part thereof and not to be
severable wholly or in any portion without material injury to the
freehold, the reservation of property as to any portion not so
severable shall be void after the goods are so affixed, as against any
person who has not expressly assented to the reservation.
Section 7 goes on to provide that conditional sales of goods which,
although affixed to realty, can be severed without "material in-
jury to the freehold" must be filed for protection against "sub-
sequent purchasers of the realty for value and without notice of
the conditional seller's title." The conditional seller of such goods
wins over a preexisting interest in the real estate even though he
does not file. Thus certain types of goods (those that cannot be
severed without "material injury to the freehold") go, on affixa-
tion, to feed the mortgage lien; apart from an express subordina-
tion, the mortgagee has an absolute priority. Indeed section 7
goes beyond a statement of priorities: an attempted conditional
sale of such goods is "void." With respect to goods which, al-
though on affixation they become part of the realty, can be severed
without material injury, the purchase money interest represented
by a conditional sale contract receives (even though itself unper-
fected) an equally absolute priority over the antecedent real
property interest (mortgage, lease, contract of sale). That is to
say, there are no limitations expressed in the statute on the ab-
solute purchase money priority: it will be a point in our discussion
whether the case law under section 7 has imposed any "equitable"
limitations on the priority comparable to those which grew up in
the nonstatutory case law earlier discussed.
The phrase "material injury to the freehold," which is not de-
fined in the statute, is meaningless in itself: the courts are, in
effect, directed to divide all kinds of property which are capable
of being affixed to real estate into two heaps. As to one heap, in a
" See the Detroit Steel opinion quoted pp. 1352-53 supra.
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priority dispute, mortgage wins over purchase money; as to the
other heap, purchase money wins over mortgage. The draftsman
of the act suggested, in his commentaries, that the class of goods
to be put in the category "not severable without material injury"
should be limited to structural materials which "are swallowed up
or drowned in the realty," following this vivid phrase with a
quotation from Justice Holmes' Detroit Steel opinion ("like
bricks or beams in a building"). 9 Except in two jurisdictions the
courts have followed the draftsman's lead: in most UCSA states
no cases have denied the purchase money priority on the ground
that the goods (other than structural materials) have become so
closely integrated with the realty as to be no longer severable
without causing "material injury."
E. Minority Interpretations of Section 7
i. The New Jersey Institutional Doctrine. - One of the de-
viant jurisdictions was New Jersey which, in a series of cases
decided during the i93o's, developed an approach to the "ma-
terial injury" question which became known as the "institutional
doctrine." Under the New Jersey gloss there was "material in-
jury" whenever the removal of equipment impaired the "integrity"
of the enterprise or institution, even though the removal did no
physical damage to the structure. Although the New Jersey courts
occasionally formulated the doctrine as a broad principle appli-
cable to all types of structures, the doctrine was in fact applied al-
most exclusively to equipment (such as refrigerating units) in-
stalled in multiple-dwelling apartment houses of recent construc-
tion.6 The limits of the doctrine (if it had limits) never became
clear. There were suggestions at various times that it might apply
to replacement equipment installed in old apartment houses as
well as to original equipment installed in new ones, to single-
family residential property as well as to large apartment houses,
See 2A UNiriom: LAWS ANx. 98 (1924).
6oCompare Lumpkin v. Holland Furnace Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 313, 178 Ati. 788
(Ct. Err. & App. 1935); Domestic Elec. Co. v. Mezzaluna, iog N.J.L. 574, 162
AtI. 722 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932); MacLeod v. Walter J. Satterthwait, Inc., 1o9 N.J.
Eq. 414, 157 AtI. 670 (Ch. 1932); Future Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Mazzochi, 107 N.J.
Eq. 422, 152 AtI. 776 (Ch. 1931), all cases in which the mortgagee prevailed over the
conditional vendor, with Sellitto v. Heating & Plumbing Fin. Corp., 1i6 N.J. Eq. 247,
x74 AtI. 147 (Ch. 1934); Reliable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Purifoy, iii N.J. Eq. 575,
163 Atl. I5i (Ch. 1932); Bank of America Nat'l Ass'n v. La Reine Hotel Corp.,
io8 N.J. Eq. 567, i56 At. 28 (Ch. 1931); Crown v. Regna Constr. Co., io4 N.J.
Eq. 469, 146 Atl. 346 (Ch. 1929), all cases in which the conditional vendors were
allowed to remove some or all of the goods.
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perhaps even to commercial and industrial enterprises (at least
small ones).61 Not the least interesting feature of the New Jersey
doctrine is its disappearance from the New Jersey reports after
1940, following ten years of almost frantic judicial activity and at
a point when it seemed that maximum confusion had been
achieved. 62 By way of imaginative speculation, it might be sug-
gested that the New Jersey courts were less interested in priorities
than they were in the plight of tenants in large apartment houses
at a time when the collapse of real estate values had cast an un-
lovely light on some of the financing methods of the 1920'S.
Rather than see a substantial part of the population condemned
to camping out on the New Jersey marshes without heat, light, or
refrigeration, the courts ordered that the essential equipment be
left in the apartment houses. This humanitarian gesture in-
cidentally gave priority to the real estate mortgagee over the
purchase money interest in the equipment.
2. The Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Mortgage Doctrine. -
The other deviant jurisdiction was Pennsylvania, where strange
and wonderful things transpired. In 1841, Chief Justice Gibson
had said: "Whether fast or loose, therefore, all the machinery of a
manufactory which is necessary to constitute it, and without which
it would not be a manufactory at all, must pass for a part of the
freehold." 63 This statement became the basis of the Pennsylvania
Industrial Plant Mortgage Doctrine.64 The case involved a dis-
pute between a real estate mortgagee and an attaching creditor
who had sought to levy on the machinery (including spare parts
which were neither affixed nor in use) of an iron mill. By holding
that all the machinery, "fast or loose," became part of the free-
hold, and thus subject to the mortgage, the court defeated the
6 1 The New Jersey cases were brilliantly analyzed by Professor Farnham of the
Cornell Law School in the course of a study prepared for the New York Law
Revision Commission. [1 9 4 21 N.Y. LAW REvIsioN Coarar'N REP. 10-21.
"The "institutional" theory was given lip service in a recent case involving
ovens installed on conditional sale in a restaurant for a tenant. The reservation of
title was declared void as to the owner of the restaurant under the "institutional"
doctrine, but the owner was held estopped to refuse to pay for the ovens because
he had bought the fixtures at a bankruptcy sale expressly conducted subject to the
lien of the conditional sale. Uttinger v. Koopman, 46 N.J. Super. 443, 134 A.2d
824 (App. Div. 1957). With the enactment of the Code in New Jersey, the "in-
stitutional doctrine" has gone to its final rest.
6 3 Voorhis v. Freeman, 2 W. & S. ii6, rig (Pa. x841).
64 See Note, The Problem of Fixtures in Relation to Pennsylvania Chattel
Security Devices, 13 U. Pnzr. L. REV. 574 (1952); Leary, Financing New Machinery
for Mortgaged Pennsylvania Industrial Plants, 4 VurL. L. REv. 498 ('959);
Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, The Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code
on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 6 U. PrrT. L. REV. 89 (1955).
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creditor's levy. A commentator has suggested that this holding
can only be understood in the light of the then state of Pennsyl-
vania chattel security law: the devices of the chattel mortgage and
the conditional sale had been outlawed and the unique Pennsyl-
vania bailment lease had not yet come into use. There was thus
no known way of financing on the security of chattel property
until Voorhis v. Freeman suggested that all the equipment used in
connection with a "manufactory" could be financed as if it were
real property, "part of the freehold." 15 The doctrine of Voorhis
v. Freeman was not restricted to "manufactories"; in the course of
time it was "applied to a private house, a multi-story office build-
ing, a five-story apartment house, an ornamental iron works, food
wholesaler, a restaurant, a stone quarry, and was considered in
the case of a church and a hotel." 66 When the problem of the
priority of a purchase money interest in equipment over an in-
dustrial plant mortgage came up, the Pennsylvania reaction was
standard: the purchase money interest (typically represented by
a bailment lease) prevailed. 7 Starting in 1915 the Pennsylvania
legislature passed a series of acts which validated the previously
outlawed conditional sale. With respect to goods affixed to realty,
the 1915 act clearly gave priority to the conditional sale over the
plant mortgage. By 1927 there had been adopted a variant of
section 7 of the UCSA, which seemed, on the face of it, more
favorable to the purchase money interest than the Uniform Act;
under the Pennsylvania version, the conditional seller could re-
move his property even though the removal caused "material in-
jury to the freehold," provided he posted satisfactory security for
making the "injury" good. Some years later the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in a decision that appears to have flabbergasted the
Pennsylvania bar, decided that "material injury to the freehold"
had to be construed in the light of the plant mortgage doctrine;
that is, there would be a "material injury" whenever anything
was removed which, under the plant mortgage doctrine, became
part of the freehold.6" This holding effectively negatived the
bond-posting provision, since it now appeared that the conditional
seller would have to make good not merely the physical damage
to the building but the difference in value between the "plant?'
as it was before and as it was after the removal. The legislature
65 See Leary, supra note 64, at 502.
66 d. at 523.
6 7 The cases are collected by Leary. Id. at 504-17.
"8 Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co. (No. 1), 316 Pa. 300, x75
At. 697 (1934).
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promptly amended the conditional sales act still again in an ap-
parent attempt to protect the purchase money interest against the
industrial plant mortgages. However, no one (except the judges
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court) had doubted that the 1927
act had done exactly that; until the court spoke again, who could
know how successful the 1935 draftsmen had been? It also
seemed possible that the court, if it chose to develop its new doc-
trine, might even reverse the priority of the bailment lessor over
the industrial plant mortgagee. On the principle of letting sleeping
dogs lie, no attempt was made, by legislative enactment, to deal
with this possibility. It turned out that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not have another opportunity to speak squarely on the
priority problem before 1954 when Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code went into effect.69 Although the court has still not
spoken, the Pennsylvania commentators seem to have no doubt
that the Code firmly establishes the priority of the purchase
money interest over the industrial plant mortgage. 0
F. Applications of Section 7
Between 192o and 1940, and particularly during the 1930's,
there was a considerable amount of priority litigation, both in
UCSA and non-UCSA states.71 In general the litigation involved
relatively small-scale financing: residential property, small fac-
tories, a few apartment houses. Comparable litigation in the con-
text of the large corporation financing a multimillion-dollar ac-
quisition of new equipment did not arise; it may be hypothesized
that such priorities were worked out in the course of negotiations
for reorganization without leaving traces in the case reports.
With respect to the small-scale financing which was litigated, it
is easy to understand the peak of the case load during the 1930's.
The gradual disappearance of such litigation during the 1940's
may be taken to reflect the cessation of new building during the
war as well as wartime prosperity. It is more difficult to explain
why there has not been a reappearance of priority litigation since
the 1940's. There has been a great deal of new building, of plant
modernization and expansion, of replacement of old equipment
6 A 1940 case, startling in the fact that it involved a conditional sale of
elevators filed under the 1925 act on which a balance was still due at the time of
suit, 14 years after filing, was decided without reference to the 1935 amendment.
Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, 339 Pa. 302, 14 A.2d 282 (1940).
11 See Robinson, McGough & Scheinholtz, and Leary, supra note 64.
"1 See, collecting cases, Annots., 73 A.L.R. 755 (1931) ; 88 A.L.R. 1324 (934);
iii A.L.R. 372 (1937); z4i A.L.R. 1288 (1942).
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with new. There has also been a series of mild recessions which
have led to a large number of bankruptcies, particularly among
relatively small enterprises. As of I95o an astute observer would
have felt safe in predicting that the courts would soon be dealing
with a new flood of priority cases. In fact there have been almost
none. There must be reasons for this unlikely turn of events, but
the present author does not know what they are. Since almost all
the case law antedates 194o and since methods both of construc-
tion and of financing have been revolutionized since 194o, an atti-
tude of wary skepticism toward the following discussion will be
appropriate.
i. The General Priority of Purchase Money Interests. - Ex-
cept for the class of goods which, when affixed, cannot be severed
without material injury to the freehold, UCSA section 7 ap-
parently gives an absolute priority to the conditional seller over
preexisting real estate interests, with no requirement that the
conditional sale contract be filed. It is true that the act gives the
priority more by indirection than by express statement. The first
sentence of section 7 makes the conditional sale of goods whose
removal would cause material injury to the freehold void except
as to persons who expressly consent to the reservation of title.
The second sentence covers the conditional sale of goods, which,
although affixed, can be severed without material injury and pro-
vides that contracts covering such goods must be filed for pro-
tection against "subsequent purchasers of the realty." Thus the
first sentence requires assent only in the case of goods whose re-
moval would cause material injury and the second sentence re-
quires filing as to the second class of goods only with respect to
subsequent purchasers. No court seems to have doubted that the
proper construction of section 7 is to give the seller priority, with-
out filing, over the antecedent real estate interest as to all goods
severable without material injury.
72
2. The Right To Remove. - Furthermore, except in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania, the courts have held that "material injury to
the freehold" meant something like "irreparable physical damage
to the structure": goods could be removed even though they were
essential to the functioning of the enterprise, even though they were
bolted down or cemented in, even though the only way to get them
72See, e.g., People's Say. & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N.W. 527
('933), in which the Wisconsin court gives an elaborate analysis of § 7. See
also Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp. 43 Del. (4 Terry) 322, 47 A.2d
164 (Super. Ct. i94i). But see Greene v. Elkins, 134 Misc. 1i8, 235 N.Y. Supp. 438
(Sup. Ct. 1929), discussed in note 86 infra.
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out was to break down the wall of the building.7 3 While a few
cases (both at common law and under the UCSA) required the
conditional seller to repair damage done in the course of removal,
the general view seems to have been that if there was a right to
remove there was no duty to reimburse the owner or other in-
terests in the real estate for damage.74
3. "Subsequent" Security Interests. - The proposition that
the conditional seller has priority over earlier interests in the
realty but not (unless he has filed) over subsequent interests has
led to some diversity of opinion about which interests are "sub-
sequent." 71 A purchaser of the realty from the conditional buyer
(or of his equity of redemption in the realty) is of course "sub-
sequent." But how about a purchaser of the realty at a fore-
closure sale held by a mortgagee whose mortgage antedated the
conditional sale? And does it make any difference if the mort-
gagee is himself the purchaser? 7" The argument in favor of the
purchaser (the conditional seller not having filed his contract) is
"a For a dramatic example of this view, see Jones v. Jos. Greenspon's Son Pipe
Corp., 381 Ill. 615, 46 N.E.2d 67 (1943) (conditional seller of pipe and casing
cemented into an oil well removed it by exploding a bomb inside the well to tear
the equipment loose).
•" The pervasive judicial conception of the irrelevancy of the conditional ven-
dor's offer to pay damages, in determining rights to personal property in these
cases, is well illustrated by Viking Equip. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 232 Ala. 543,
168 So. 566 (1936). The case involved a sprinkler system which would pass by
accession to the mortgagee in the absence of a title-retaining agreement. The
upper court approved the doctrine that a conditional sale contract prevents the
fixture from falling under the mortgage Hen if no material injury results from
removal, but refused to upset the lower court's finding that material damage to
the building would result in this case. The conditional vendor's offer to pay the
$8oo estimated cost of restoration of the building (the offer being made after the
lower court's decision) was characterized as "belated" and of no relevance in
determining legal rights. The court declared that an offer to pay damages
could not entitle the vendor to remove the sprinkler system if he had no legal
right to do so, and the mortgagee prevailed.
" See, e.g., In re Tonawanda Brewing Corp., 13 F. Supp. 345 (W.DN.Y.
1936); American Laundry Mach. Co. v. Larson, 217 Wis. 208, 257 N.W. 6o
(1934); Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Franzke-Schiffman Realty Co., 211
Wis. 659, 248 N.W. 178 (1933). Several New York cases have held a prior mort-
gagee, making subsequent advances under a mortgage providing for such ad-
vances, protected as a subsequent purchaser for the amount advanced after affixa-
tion. See, e.g., Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N.Y. 343, i82
N.E. 1o (932); New York & Suburban Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crescent
Constr. Corp., 196 Misc. 532, 92 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Lloyds First
Mortgage Corp. v. Lombardo, 227 App. Div. 400, 237 N.Y. Supp. 456 (1929).
"o Generally, the mortgagee who purchases at his foreclosure sale is not held to
be a protected "subsequent purchaser." See, e.g., Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners
Loan Corp., 43 Del. (4 Terry) 322, 47 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. I94I); Standard Dry-
Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N.C. 481, 90 S.E. 564 (i916).
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that, being without notice of the purchase money interest, he has
bid for the property in the belief that the fixtures were unencum-
bered. The argument in favor of the conditional seller, which is
somewhat conceptual, is that the interest of the foreclosure pur-
chaser (whether he is the mortgagee or a third party) derives
from and must "relate back" to the mortgage and therefore can-
not be "subsequent." In the usual case the conditional seller in-
tervenes in the foreclosure proceeding before there has been a
sale so that the purchase without notice rarely takes place." If
he lies back and does nothing until an innocent purchaser has
bought the property, the purchaser (particularly if he has paid
cash and not merely bid the property in for the unpaid balance of
his mortgage) seems to have a good case for protection against
the nonfiler.
4. The "New for Old" Problem.- Installation of new equip-
ment in an old structure often means tearing out old equipment.
The mortgagee of the old equipment, if dispute arises between him
and the purchase money financer of the new equipment, will
argue that the wrongful removal of his original security should
have the result of subordinating the purchase money interest to
the mortgage. In a New York case of this type it was apparently
held that such a wrongful removal, carried out by the conditional
seller in the course of installation of the new equipment, sub-
ordinated the purchase money interest in toto to the mortgage
without regard to the value of the property removed, unless the
conditional seller could bear the burden of proving that the
property removed was useless and had no value at all.78 The case
involved the substitution of a steam heating plant for a seven-
year-old hot air furnace in a building which appears to have been
used as a residence; there was no proof of the value or condition
of the hot air furnace or of what had happened to it except that it
had been somehow "disposed of" by the conditional seller. The
theory of the inadequate per curiam opinion in the appellate divi-
sion was that the removal "impaired the security of the mortgage,"
was a wrongful act, and consequently required the subordination
of the purchase money interest. Such a reversal of priorities,
without regard to the values involved, seems too severe a sanc-
tion, even if the purchase money man is a wrongdoer. If he has
"'See, e.g., People's Say. & Trust Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N.W. 527
('933).
8 Roche v. Thurber, 246 App. Div. 850, 285 N.Y. Supp. 82 (1936), aff'd mer.,
272 N.Y. 582, 4 N.E.2d 814 (1936). The case is discussed at length by Farnham,
supra note 61, at 34-38.
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taken the old equipment away and sold it, he should be required to
account to the mortgagee for its fair value. If worn-out or in-
efficient equipment is replaced by new or better equipment, there
is no impairment of the mortgagee's security.79 It is of course
possible to imagine the case of a mortgagor who improvidently
replaces perfectly good equipment with equipment which is no
better and may be worse while the conditional seller (the ethics of
salesmanship being what they are) cheers him on. In such a case
the priorities might appropriately be reversed, at least to the ex-
tent of the impairment of the mortgagee's security. But the mere
fact that new equipment has been substituted for old does not
require so drastic a solution.
G. The Construction Mortgage Exception
As we have seen, the construction mortgage has accounted for
the most persistent exception to the rule of purchase money
priority. In the construction mortgage cases the owner-mortgagor,
being under a duty, express or implied, to the mortgagee to com-
plete the structure free of paramount liens, has failed to do so -
either because he has diverted the mortgage money to other uses
or because the costs of construction have outrun his estimate. On
such facts, from the days of the early railroad cases on,80 the
mortgagee has frequently prevailed over the purchase money
claimant. The minority or Massachusetts rule, which is said to
deny the priority of the purchase money interest over the mort-
gage, has been most often applied in favor of the mortgagee in
cases where he has financed (or thought he was financing) the
construction; 8I the "institutional doctrine" which developed in
New Jersey under section 7 of the UCSA was also in most cases
invoked in favor of construction mortgagees.
8 2
The idea that the construction mortgage may be entitled to
priority over the purchase money claims which accrue in the
course of construction has thus shown an astonishing capacity to
persist. This is the more surprising in view of the fact that no
"o This view prevailed in Keil Motor Co. v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 43 Del.
(4 Terry) 322, 47 A.2d 164 (Super. Ct. 1941). See also Woodliff v. Citizens' Bldg. &
Realty Co., 240 Mich. 413, 215 N.W. 343 (1927) (old elevator, apparently not in
use, replaced by new elevator; court refused to consider the replacement argument
because of lack of evidence as to value and final disposition of old elevator; vendor
permitted to remove new elevator).
'o See, e.g., Tippett & Wood v. Barham, iSo Fed. 76 (4th Cir. 19o); Harris v.
Youngstown Bridge Co., go Fed. 322 (6th Cir. 1898), discussed p. I345 supra.
Si See p. 1357 and cases cited note 54 supra.
See p. 136o and cases cited note 6o supra.
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"construction mortgage" doctrine, formulated as an exception to
the general rule of priority, ever clearly emerged from the cases.
It is rare to run across a statement as explicit as the following
passage in the opinion of a California intermediate court of ap-
peals, explaining the rationale of the leading California case of
Dauch v. Ginsburg: 83
In the Dauch case the loan was made for the purpose of construct-
ing a hotel building. The owner and the encumbrancer contem-
plated and agreed that the security for the loan should be not
only the real property but also the completed hotel building. The
conditional seller of the plumbing and heating equipment knew
there was a prior encumbrance against the completed structure;
knew that the building was being erected for a hotel and for no
other purpose; knew that the hotel could not be operated if the
equipment in question were removed; and knew that such a sever-
ance would substantially diminish the security of the prior encum-
brancer. In such a case it was held that the rights and claims of the
conditional seller of the equipment must yield to those of the prior
encumbrancer 8 4
There has never been a clear formulation in the cases of the
policy which may underlie the persistent tendency of the courts in
various jurisdictions under a great variety of theories to prefer
the construction mortgagee. There seems to be an uneasy feeling
that to subordinate the mortgagee in such a case would be some-
how to work a fraud on him, 5 but exactly why this should be so is
never pursued. By hypothesis the mortgagee has advanced his
funds in the expectation that they would be used to finance the
construction and that the completed structure (apartment house,
hotel, factory or what not), free of paramount liens, would be his
security. However, the owner-builder-mortgagor, in violation of
his agreement, has brought in some or all of the equipment sub-
ject to purchase money claims. The mortgagee is naturally dis-
appointed, but it remains true that the purchase money man has
supplied the equipment and remains unpaid. Why should the
mortgagee be made whole at his expense? Should not the mort-
gagee, instead of trusting the mortgagor to disburse the funds
s3 214 Cal. 540, 6 P.2d 952 (193).
84 Grupp v. Margolis, I53 Cal. App. 2d 500, 504, 314 P.2d 820, 823 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957). In the light of that analysis of the Dauch case, the court refused to sub-
ordinate a purchase money interest in a case where it did not appear that the
mortgagee had advanced funds for the specific purpose of enabling the mort-
gagor to acquire the property which later came in subject to a conditional sale
agreement.
85 Cf. the language of Taft, C.J., in Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., go Fed.
322, 329 (6th Cir. 1898), quoted p. 1345 supra.
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properly, have seen to it that the purchase money men were paid?
It may be that the cases obscurely reflect the thought that, as be-
tween the typical mortgagee (or typical bondholder) and the
typical purchase money man, the latter is in the better position to
prevent the fraud. At all events, the consistency of result in
cases of this type, no matter what doctrine the court swears its
allegiance to, argues for the soundness of some underlying, albeit
inarticulate, policy.
None of the cases arising under section 7 of the UCSA has dis-
cussed the possibility that an antecedent construction mortgage
should win over the subsequent conditional sale of goods which
could be severed without material injury to the freehold, 6 al-
though there are section 7 cases in which the statement of facts
suggests that a construction mortgage was involved; that is, the
date of the mortgage is only a few days or weeks earlier than the
date of the conditional sale.87 Thus the apparently absolute pri-
ority which section 7 gives the conditional sale over the antecedent
mortgage once the material injury hurdle has been jumped has not
been whittled away by a case law exception in favor of construc-
tion mortgages. On the other hand, the possibility of such a read-
ing of section 7 does not seem to have been brought squarely to
the attention of any court.
"I But see Greene v. Elkins, 134 Misc. 118, 235 N.Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1929),
in which a conditional vendor of an elevator appears to have been subordinated
to a preexisting mortgage. The express ground of subordination was that the
conditional vendor had not filed, a holding which is in flat violation of § 7 of the
UCSA, then in force in New York. Section 7 is set out p. 1359 supra; see
cases cited note 72 supra. The mortgage which was given priority was, how-
ever, a construction mortgage. The opinion contains the following passage:
The instant case presents to a striking extent the danger to the existing in-
cumbrancer. Mr. Greene [mortgagee] advanced money and materials to build
the block in suit, and he sees the elevator installed and he bad the right to
suppose that the money he advanced was used to pay for it; but so far from
that being the case, what he supposed had become a part of the block upon
which he relied for security, was, if the [elevator] company's claim is sus-
tained, the company's personal property, and can be severed, even though
seventy per cent of the purchase price has been paid.
134 Misc. at 120, 235 N.Y. Supp. at 440.
" In addition to Greene v. Elkins, supra note 86, see, e.g., People's Say. & Trust
Co. v. Munsert, 212 Wis. 449, 249 N.W. 527 (1933). Another instructive case is
Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N.Y. 343, 182 N.E. 10 (1932), in
which a building loan mortgagee, who made advances as construction progressed,
won over a conditional seller of lighting fixtures who delivered the fixtures (but
failed to file his contract) before the mortgagee made his final advance. The
conditional seller was, however, allowed to reclaim some of the equipment which
had been delivered but not installed. This seems to have been on the theory that
the mortgage, as drafted, covered only equipment "attached to or used in con-
nection with" the building, and that uninstalled lighting fixtures were neither
"attached" nor "in use.')
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IV. THE ARTICLE 9 "PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST"
A. The After-Acquired Property Interest Expanded
Under Article 9 the question of purchase money priority seems
to take on dimensions which it did not have under pre-Code law.8
The priority issue is essentially a function of the degree to which
the law recognizes the after-acquired property interest as being
fully perfected. Except for growing crops and consumer goods,
Article 9 places no limitation on a lender's right to tie up all his
debtor's future property.89 Thus priority disputes between after-
acquired and purchase money interests are at least theoretically
possible over a much broader range than under pre-Code law.
Despite the theoretical possibility, it does not necessarily follow
that the actual range of priority litigation will be any broader
under Article 9 than in the past. If the pre-Code pattern under
which the long-term financing of the fixed assets of an enterprise
was divorced from the short-term financing of its inventory and
receivables is maintained under Article 9, there is no reason to
anticipate novel types of priority litigation. On the other hand, if
secured parties rush in to take the fullest advantage of the so-
called "floating lien" provisions of the Article there will be, next
depression time, a rash of priority cases in unheard-of volume and
in unfamiliar contexts. There has not been sufficient experience
in states which have enacted the Code to substantiate a prediction
whether lenders will conservatively adhere to the old pattern or
whether they will rush down a steep place to destruction. What
might be called the "don't be a pig" school of advice to Article 9
lenders has a fashionable currency and may be expected to have
"8No attempt will be made in this paper to summarize and explain the basic
concepts and general structure of Article 9. See Coogan, A Suggested Analytical
Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 63 CoLrUM. L. REV. i
(1963); Coogan, The Lazy Lawyer's Guide to Secured Transactions Under the
Code, 6o Mic. L. REv. 685 (1962). With respect to the Article 9 treatment of
priorities, see Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among
Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. REV. 838 ('959). These and
Mr. Coogan's other articles on Article 9 are highly recommended, indeed essential,
reading.
" Section 9-204(3): "Except as provided in subsection (4) a security agree-
ment may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations
covered by the security agreement." Subsection (4) contains the limitations to this
general principle with respect to crops and consumer goods. Section 9-204(3), read
in conjunction with other provisions of Article 9, makes entirely clear that the after-
acquired property interest is fully perfected (assuming compliance with filing pro-
visions) from the time the property is acquired by the debtor; it is, in the old-style
terminology, a "legal," not an "equitable," interest.
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some influence on lending patternsY0 The present author is in-
clined to guess that the permissive floating lien, the whole-hog
after-acquired property clause, will not be unduly exploited and
that the nature of purchase money priority litigation will remain
about what it has been under pre-Code law.
B. The Purchase Money Security Interest
The general approach to the question of purchase money pri-
ority is thus stated in the comment to 9-312:
Prior law, under one or another theory, usually contrived to
protect purchase money interests over after-acquired property
interests (to the extent to which the after-acquired property in-
terest was recognized at all). . . While this Article broadly
validates the after-acquired property interest, it also recognizes
as sound the preference which prior law gave to the purchase
money interest.
The preference given to purchase money is worked out in a
series of provisions which deal with inventory collateral, collateral
other than inventory, and fixturesY1 Each of these provisions will
require separate examination. The starting point of our dis-
cussion, however, must be the statutory definition of the term
"purchase money security interest."
Section 9-107 provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to
the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all
or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring
an obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights
in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.
90 See, e.g., Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities
Among Secured Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. R.v 838, 873-75
('959) ; Memorandum of Robt. Weeks, [1956] 2 N.Y. LAw R VlsiON CoMi'N¢ RF,.
(Legislative Doc. No. 65) at io8o. See also the discussion of the controversy about
the Article 9 floating lien in Part I supra.
91 For the sake of completeness, reference should also be made to 9-314 on
accessions. The draftsmen seem to have assumed that the priority problems with
respect to what are called "accessions" ("goods . . . installed in or affixed to other
goods") are identical with the priority problems with respect to "fixtures" (goods
affixed to real property). Thus 9-314 on accessions is a Chinese copy of 9-313 on
fixtures. Whether or not the draftsmen were correct in their assumption, the
problem of accessions is one of limited interest which could hardly be expected to
excite the passions of even the most fanatical devotee of Article 9. It will not be
further discussed in this paper.
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i. Purchase Money Interests in Intangibles. - Traditionally
the only type of purchase money interest which the law has con-
cerned itself with has been the interest in goods. The use of the
broad term "collateral" in 9-107 suggests the possibility of such
an interest in some types of intangibles. In the nature of things it
is almost impossible to conceive of a situation, other than the kind
which practitioners refer to as "academic," in which intangible
money claims could be made the subject of a purchase money
transaction. A hypothetical A might advance money to B to en-
able him to purchase a negotiable instrument from C, in which
case A might be able to claim a "purchase money interest" in the
negotiable instrument, but the case is clearly not worth bothering
about. On the other hand a bank which acquires a document of
title against honor or discount of a draft would seem to have a pur-
chase money interest in the document (as well as in the underly-
ing goods) both while it keeps the document in its possession and
after it has turned the document over to its customer, the buyer.
Furthermore, the species of property which the Code calls "gener-
al intangibles" 92 could easily become the subject of a purchase
money transaction. For example, an inventor transfers his patent
(or rights under it) for a sum to be paid in installments, reserv-
ing a security interest until paid; or a bank lends money to the X
Corporation for the purpose of enabling it to acquire the in-
ventor's patent, reserving a security interest in the patent. It is
true that the comment to 9-107 talks only about the normal case
of a purchase money interest in goods and that the use of the
term "collateral" in the text of the section antedates the introduc-
tion of the term "general intangibles." 93 There seems to be no
reason, however, why the term "collateral" should have other than
its normal meaning; the purchase money concept may thus, in an
occasional case, apply to intangible property. In our subsequent
discussion, however, we shall, avoiding flights of fancy, restrict
ourselves to goods (and, to some degree, documents of title).
2. Section 9-1o7(a).- There is nothing novel in that part of
92 Article 9, in addition to dividing all "goods" into four defined categories (9-
zoS), divides intangible claims into six categories. These are chattel paper, docu-
ments of title, instruments, accounts, contract rights, and general intangibles (the
first three terms are defined in 9-IO5, the last three in 9-io6). "General intangi-
bles" is the residual or catchall category: "any personal property (including things
in action) other than goods, accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, documents
and instruments." The neophyte in the mysteries of Article 9 may be relieved to
learn that not a great deal turns on this formidable array of definitions.
"' "General intangibles" appears first in the 1957 draft of the Code, while "col-
lateral" is used in the 1952 draft.
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the definition which deals with the interest taken or retained by a
"seller." Although "seller" is mercifully not subjected to defini-
tion, the term is evidently used in contrast with the "person . . .
making advances or incurring an obligation" in 9-107(b): he is
a seller "in the economic sense," as the old conditional sales cases
used to say, not a lender of money." A seller's security interest
qualifies as "purchase money" only to the extent that it serves to
"secure all or part of . . . [the] price." There have been occa-
sional attempts to manipulate the conditional sale device in such a
way as to make it cover obligations other than the unpaid pur-
chase price of goods sold, but the manipulators have regularly
failed in their attempts to square the circle.9 5 In the same man-
ner, it would be impossible for a seller to promote to purchase
money rank under 9-107 any obligation which is not unpaid pur-
chase price.
3. Section 9-ro7(b). -The second branch of the definition
includes some interests whose claim to purchase money rank may
not have been clear under pre-Code law. It has always been clear
that a person taking by assignment from a seller inherited the
seller's purchase money interest and presumably it would never
have been doubted that a person who, on the buyer's behalf, ad-
vances the purchase price directly to the seller has a purchase
money interest. It has been less clear whether a person who ad-
vances money to the buyer, which the buyer then uses to pay the
price, has such an interest; under pre-Code law he could not use
the conditional sale device 91 and the traditional concept of the
purchase money mortgage assumes that the mortgage runs in the
first instance directly to the seller. Such a person does have a pur-
chase money interest under paragraph (b) of 9-107. It should be
noted, however, that the person claiming the purchase money in-
terest will have to show both that his advance was made for the
purpose of enabling the debtor to acquire the collateral and that
it was in fact so used. To avoid what could turn out to be a
complicated proof, a person who wants to be sure of having a
purchase money interest will be well advised to make his advance
directly to the seller (or by check made out to the seller's order).
94 See Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash. 2d 44, 120 P.2d 523 (1941).
15 See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey, 6i F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1932).
" See, e.g., Manlove v. Maggart, iii Ind. App. 398, 41 N.E.2d 633 (1942).
Here money was lent to defendant to buy furniture. At a later date defendant
executed to lender a conditional sale contract covering furniture. The court held
replevin by lender would not lie since lender never acquired title to furniture.
Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley, 12 Wash. 2d 44, 120 P.2d 523 (1941), was another
case of this type.
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If he pays over money to a debtor, who at some subsequent time
pays over an equivalent sum to his seller, the difficulties of proof,
both as to the purpose of the loan and as to its being "in fact so
used," are obvious; the longer the time gap between the making
of the loan and the acquisition of the property, the greater the
difficulties.
There is nothing in the "in fact so used" language which should
require courts to apply the artificial techniques which have been
invented to "trace" money into and out of bank accounts, but on
the other hand there is nothing to keep them from using such
techniques. No doubt the language of paragraph (b) assumes
the sequence of loan first and acquisition second or assumes that
the loan and acquisition take place simultaneously. Suppose,
however, that debtor acquires goods on Monday (on unsecured
credit from his seller) and secured party advances the price on
Tuesday. There is no doubt, we may assume, about the money
being "in fact so used"; the question would be whether a loan
made after acquisition could be fairly described as one made "to
enable" the acquisition. Or, to make the case harder, assume that
the buyer pays the price (or writes a check) on Monday and bor-
rows that amount from the secured party on Tuesday. Now there
is trouble both on the "to enable" side and on the "in fact so
used" side. Nevertheless, in both the hypothetical cases just put
a court could reasonably find that the secured party had acquired
a purchase money interest. If the loan transaction appears to be
closely allied to the purchase transaction, that should suffice. The
evident intent of paragraph (b) is to free the purchase money con-
cept from artificial limitations; rigid adherence to particular
formalities and sequences should not be required. 7
4. "New Value" in 9-1o7(b).- The "person" described in
paragraph (b) is evidently one who gives what the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act called "new value." Early drafts of Article
9 98 attempted a comprehensive definition of the term "new
value." Drafting difficulties led to the abandonment of the defini-
tion, although the term itself was retained. In 9-io8, which deals
97 Early drafts of 9-io7 contained an additional paragraph (c) which en-
visioned a purchase money interest to the extent of value advanced for the pur-
pose of financing new acquisitions within ten days of the debtor's receiving pos-
session of the new goods even though the value was not in fact used to pay the price.
The paragraph was deleted, according to the sponsors, because it extended the
purchase money interest too far. See 1956 RECOMM-DATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL
BOAu FOR THE UNIORM. CO XERCAL CODE § 9-107. It may be that the sponsors
intended to exclude the type of purchase money interests suggested above in the
second hypothetical.
9 See § 8-Xo5(2) (Oct. 1949).
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with the problem of when interests in after-acquired property are
to be considered as having been taken for new value or for old
debt, there is a reference to a secured party who "makes an ad-
vance, incurs an obligation, releases a perfected security interest,
or otherwise gives new value . . ." The comment to 9-io8
suggests that
the several illustrations of "new value" given in the text [i.e., ad-
vances, obligations, releases] ...as well as the "purchase money
security interest" definition in Section 9-107 indicate the nature of
the concept. In other situations it is left to the courts to distinguish
between "new" and "old" value, between present considerations
and antecedent debt.
There is no apparent reason why the concept of "new value" with
respect to a purchase money security interest under 9-107 should
be any less broad than the concept as it appears in 9-o8.
Evidently no past consideration or antecedent debt will support
the 9-107 purchase money interest. Something must be given,
more or less simultaneously with the debtor's acquisition of prop-
erty, which is intended to, and which does, enable him to acquire
the property. The "something" need not be a purse of gold or its
present-day negotiable equivalent. Taken literally, 9-107 seems
to say that only "making advances" or "incurring an obligation"
(which would presumably include a commitment to the debtor to
make an advance as well as a binding promise, by way of guaranty
or otherwise, to pay the seller) qualify as "value" for the purpose
of 9-107. It is suggested, in line with the 9-IO8 comment, that
the references to advances and obligations be taken in 9-107, as
they clearly must be taken in 9-io8, as merely illustrations of the
underlying concept of "new value." 99
5. The Debtor's Interest in the Property. - The interest un-
der paragraph (b), like that under paragraph (a), is restricted
to the property acquired by the debtor by virtue of the purchase
money loan. Paragraph (a) makes the point simply and di-
rectly, while (b) is wordy and circuitous, but there is no reason to
doubt their identity of meaning. According to (b), the debtor
may use the loan to acquire "rights in or the use of" the property.
The idea seems to be that there can be a purchase money interest
not only in property in which the debtor acquires rights of owner-
ship but also in that which he is merely entitled to use - for ex-
ample, in property under a "true" lease which is not intended for
security, the "purchase money" loan going presumably to pay the
" Cf. § 9-107, comment.
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rental. The concept of a purchase money interest in a leasehold
(which would not, of course, be good against the lessor) does
credit to the draftsmen's ingenuity but is unlikely to have much
impact in the real world.
6. Simultaneous Purchase Money Interests.- It seems pos-
sible for there to be more than one purchase money interest in the
same property. Assume, for example, that a lender makes an ad-
vance for fifty per cent of the purchase price, the seller retaining
a security interest in the goods for the unpaid balance. The seller
would have a purchase money interest under paragraph (a), the
lender would have one under (b). Or two lenders could con-
tribute toward the purchase money, each taking a paragraph (b)
interest to the extent that his money was "so used." (If the debtor
fraudulently procures two loans, each lender believing that he is
to receive a purchase money interest, their interests in the pur-
chased property would depend on whose money was "so used":
if both lenders had been equally innocent, or equally careless, a
fair solution would be to find that each of the victims had con-
tributed money which was used toward the price.) In cases of
the type just supposed, there is nothing in 9-107 to give priority
to one of the purchase money interests over the other. If both of
them attached and became perfected at the same time, they
would presumably rank equally.' If they attached or became
perfected at different times, priority between them would be
regulated by 9-312 (5) ."'
100 Cf. § 9-315 ("Priority When Goods Are Commingled or Processed").
101 A road map to the highways and byways of the Article 9 treatment of
priorities will be of great help to the unfamiliar traveler. A sequence of eleven sec-
tions (9-3o6 - 9-316) is exclusively devoted to this subject, and other sections out-
side the sequence are relevant in some priority situations. Most of these sections
state special rules for more or less precisely defined priority situations. In Part
VII of this paper we shall be concerned with 9-313, "Priority of Security Interests
in Fixtures." Section 9-312 ambitiously undertakes to construct a series of general
propositions to cover all cases not subject to one of the special rules stated in the
other sections in the sequence. Subsection (i) is a list of other sections which
state "rules of priority" in a variety of special situations. These rules of priority,
according to § (i), "shall govern where applicable"; that is to say, take precedence
in case of conflict, over the provisions of 9-312 itself. Three following subsections
of 9-312 take up three special situations: § (2) deals with crop loans, § (3) with
purchase money interests in inventory, § (4) with purchase money interests in col-
lateral other than inventory. Finally, § (5) states a general, residual rule for de-
termining priorities in cases not covered by the preceding subsections or by the
other sections listed in § (i). (Subsection (6) is ancillary to § (5) and merely
states a rule of interpretation for applying the provisions of § (s).) The residual
rule of 9-312(5) is that competing interests rank in the order in which they are
perfected. It is sometimes referred to as the "first to file" rule, which is accurate
if all the interests involved have been perfected by filing.
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V. INVENTORY
A. The Code Provisions
Section 9-312(3) provides:
A purchase money security interest in inventory collateral has
priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral
if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time
the debtor receives possession of the collateral; and
(b) any secured party whose security interest is known to the
holder of the purchase money security interest or who, prior to
the date of the filing made by the holder of the purchase money
security interest, had filed a financing statement covering the
same items or type of inventory, has received notification of the
purchase money security interest before the debtor receives pos-
session of the collateral covered by the purchase money security
interest; and
(c) such notification states that the person giving the notice has
or expects to acquire a purchase money security interest in in-
ventory of the debtor, describing such inventory by item or type.
x. Scope of Priority Rules. - With this provision the Article 9
priority rules move into uncharted territory. Priority disputes
between competing financers of inventory have simply not arisen
at the inventory stage, although there has been a considerable
amount of litigation between inventory financers using the trust
receipt device and rival claimants to the "proceeds" after the
inventory has been sold.0 2 To the extent that the factor's lien
acts may have authorized after-acquired interests in inventory,
disputes between these and purchase money interests in inven-
tory could, hypothetically, have arisen. However, it has never
been clear that the factor's lien acts contemplated such arrange-
ments and no such practice has ever grown up. Inventory financ-
ing, under factor's lien, trust receipt, or any other device, has al-
ways been "new value" financing of the purchase money type.
Another hypothetical possibility has been a priority conflict be-
tween two or more inventory financers, each of whom makes a
new value (and, at least in intention, purchase money) advance
against the same inventory, each having been deceived by the
"' The cases involved consumer paper such as conditional sale contracts. Typi-
cally the purchaser of the paper won over the inventory financer. See Gilmore,
The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. Io57 (1954).
For the Code's resolution of the problem, see 9-308.
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borrower into thinking that his advance is the only one. Such a
case came up at least once under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
and was decided in favor of the entruster whose money happened
to go up first.13 A harder case, which has never come up, would
involve one lender who perfected his interest under the Trust
Receipts Act and another who perfected his under a factor's lien
act. The almost complete absence of such litigation suggests that
the tight control which inventory financers have learned (or been
required) to keep over their debtors' operations has had the
desirable result of preventing the situation from arising in the
first place.
It is entirely possible that the inventory priority provisions of
9-312 (3) will remain a dead letter, and it may be hoped that they
will. They will come into play only if long-term lenders yield to
the temptation of including the debtor's inventory in their
security and if competing inventory lenders, although aware of
each other's presence, nevertheless proceed on a "Damn the
torpedoes -full speed ahead" approach. Both these contingen-
cies seem as unlikely as they are undesirable.
2. "Conflicting Security Interest." - The "conflicting" interest
with which the purchase money interest may come into competi-
tion may be (i) an interest claimed under an after-acquired
property clause by a secured party who has made no new advance
against the property covered by the purchase money interest; or
(2) an interest claimed by a secured party who has made such an
advance but has done so under circumstances which do not entitle
him to a purchase money security interest under 9-1o7.O4
The purchase money interest wins over the after-acquired
property interest if the purchase money interest is perfected no
later than the time when, the debtor receives possession of the in-
ventory and if the purchase money secured party has complied
with the notification requirements of subsection (3).
3. "Receives Possession." - This phrase is evidently meant to
refer to the moment when the goods are physically delivered at
the debtor's place of business - not to the possibility of the
debtor acquiring rights in the goods at an earlier point by identifi-
cation or appropriation to the contract of sale or by shipment of
10 Donn v. Auto Dealers Inv. Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N.E.2d 69g (1944).
104 As pointed out p. 1376 supra, it is possible under 9-io7 for there to be
more than one purchase money interest in the same property. It does not seem,
however, that these multiple interests could be in "conflict": they would represent
contributions to the purchase price and could never add up to more than ioo% of
the price. Apart from the rule of 9-312(5) they seem entitled to share ratably, and
neither § (3) nor § (4) of 9-312 would apply to the situation.
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the goods under a term which throws their risk on the debtor.
Normally, the inventory interest would be perfected by filing:
the inventory secured party who wishes to be sure that he will be
entitled to the 9-312 (3) priority will therefore file his financing
statement before he makes any advances to the debtor on his in-
coming goods. A bank which initiated a transaction by making
an advance against a bill of lading could argue that its interest
was first perfected by its possession of the bill of lading, continued
perfected after the bill had been turned over to the debtor under
the automatic (2 i-day) perfection provision of 9-304, and could
be thereafter perfected indefinitely by filing after the debtor had
received the goods.1 5 This is, however, rather an argument to
be made in litigation than a policy to be deliberately adopted be-
fore the event. The documentary bank, if it is well advised, will,
like any other inventory financer, protect itself by an advance
filing.
B. Notification
Before the debtor "receives possession," the purchase money
secured party must not only have filed (or otherwise perfected
hig interest) but also have complied with the notification require-
ment. There is no formal requirement that the notification be
signed or even that it be in writing: it must, however, have been
"received" by the party entitled to the notification before the
goods reach the debtor and must contain the information required
by 9-312 (3) (c). The notification may evidently be given either
before or after the purchase money interest has attached, since
it may state that the person giving the notice either "has or ex-
pects to acquire" a purchase money interest. Notification given
after the debtor receives the goods is ineffective. However, it is
possible for the interest to attach before possession is received if
the debtor "acquires rights" in the goods under the contract of sale
or shipment.'0 6 In view of the importance of the time sequences
under subsection (3), all required notifications should be given
well in advance of any particular transaction.
x. Parties To Be Notified. - Before making his own filing, the
105 Under 9-304(5) the bank's interest, initially perfected by possession of the
bill of lading, would, without filing, remain perfected for 21 days after the bill had
been turned over to the debtor. Section 9-303(2) provides:
If a security interest is originally perfected in any way permitted under this
Article and is subsequently perfected in some other way under this Article,
without an intermediate period when it was unperfected, the security interest
shall be deemed to be perfected continuously for the purposes of this Article.
I06 For the rules concerning the "attachment" of a security interest, see 9-204.
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purchase money party must search the files and give notice to all
parties who are already on file with financing statements which
cover the same types of inventory which the purchase money man
intends to claim.1 7 Unless the central filing provisions of the
Article have been completely abandoned in a particular state, 08
it will be sufficient for the purchase money party to check the
secretary of state's files.0 9 The notification must go not only to all
previous filers but to all secured parties whose interests are
"known" to the purchase money man. A question could be raised
whether the notification requirement applies to previous filings
which for some reason are ineffective (because of lapse, failure
to comply with formal requirements, filing in the wrong place).
Since notification is cheap and easy and law suits are expensive
and difficult, the part of wisdom is obviously to notify everyone
in sight without regard to the quality of any particular interest.
2. Period of Effectiveness. - The notification, once given, is
effective indefinitely (although it might be reasonable for a court
to apply the 9-403 financing statement lapse provisions to notifi-
cations given under 9-312(3): if so, the notification would be
effective for five years). That is to say, the notification preserves
the purchase money party's priority with respect to not only the
immediate transaction but any other transactions subsequently
entered into. Article 9 contains provisions which go into elaborate
detail on how the files can be cleared of financing statements
which no longer represent existing obligations or commitments: no
there are no comparable provisions with respect to 9-312(3)
notifications. As in the case of lapse, it would be reasonable to
apply these financing statement provisions by analogy to the
notifications. For example, a purchase money party who could
be required to file a termination statement under 9-404 could also
be required to send a notice of termination to recipients of his
9-312 (3) notifications.
3. Notification of Subsequent Interests.- Once the purchase
money party has filed his own financing statement, he is not re-
2
0 7 The official draft of Article 9 contemplates in 9-4o(i)( c) that all inventory
filing must be made in the office of the secretary of state (even though there may
be, in some cases, a requirement for an additional local filing).
'08 This has been done in the Kentucky version of Article 9, except in the nar-
row category of nonresidents without a principal place of business in the state.
Ky. REV. STAT. § 355.9-401(I) (Supp. 1962).
'0 There are some situations in which, under 9-103 (2), filing with respect to
certain types of inventory (mobile chattels held for lease) is to be made in the
state in which the debtor's "chief place of business" is located and not in the
state or states in which the inventory is located.
110
See § 9-404.
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quired to make any further check of the files. As to parties whose
filings are subsequent to his own (and who have not notified him
of their intention to engage in purchase money transactions) his
priority is not subject to the notification requirement, even though
the transaction as to which he claims the priority is in its turn sub-
sequent to the later filing. He must, however, notify parties whose
interests attach subsequently to his date of filing if such interests
are "known" to him. Pre-1956 drafts of 9-312 (3) were at least
ambiguous on the effectiveness of the notification as to subse-
quently filing parties; the early drafts could well have been read
to mean that the purchase money party had to notify anyone who
had filed at the time of any particular transaction, which in the
case of a continuing inventory financing arrangement would,
theoretically, have required a daily check of the files. The I956
revision of 9-312 left no doubt that the date of the purchase
money party's own filing was the cutoff point, except with re-
spect to subsequent interests of which the purchase money party
has actual knowledge.
4. Problems of Notification Sequence. - When the purchase
money interest comes into conflict with an interest claimed under
an after-acquired property clause by a secured party who makes
no new advance against the newly acquired property, the notifica-
tion mechanism seems to work simply and well. The after-ac-
quired property interest is subordinated to the purchase money
interest, as it should be. The holder of the after-acquired property
interest has, by the notification, been advised of the true situation
so that he will not be misled. The requirement that the purchase
money interest be perfected not later than the time when the
debtor receives possession of the goods is not burdensome, since,
from the date of the purchase money man's own filing, his interest
will be automatically perfected at or before the possession point.
The mechanism may not work quite so smoothly when the two
interests which come into conflict are both new value interests,
although the difficulties which can be hypothesized may be more
apparent than real. Assume that A is engaged in purchase money
financing of debtor X's inventory of widgets and has filed a proper
financing statement. A now receives a proper notification from B
which states that B "has or expects to acquire" a purchase money
security interest in X's widget inventory. Must A now retire
from the field? Or may he send a return notification to B (whose
interest, it would seem, is now "known" to A) which states that
A plans to go right on acquiring purchase money interests in the
widgets? And (at least if he sends the return notification) may
1963] 1381
HeinOnline -- 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1381 1962-1963
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
he continue financing X, making sure that the money he puts up
is "in fact . . . used" to acquire the widgets, so that his interest
will be a "purchase money interest" under 9-107 and B's will
not? And what if B sends A a second notification, and so on in
an endless series? Section 9-312(3) sensibly makes no attempt
to answer these wild-eyed hypotheticals. In such a situation, A
and B, once they have become aware of each other's presence, will
be well advised to sit down together and come to an agreement:
the notification mechanism will not solve their problems for them.
If, in defiance of common, sense, they engage in a battle of notifi-
cations, they should both be hung. It is not worth anyone's time
to try to figure out the priorities between them.
5. Notification as to Retained Interests After Surrender of
Documents. - Another hypothetical situation, which may deserve
more careful analysis than the one just put, has to do with the
bank which originally acquires its purchase money interest by
making an advance against a bill of lading or other document of
title which covers goods which are destined for the buyer's in-
ventory. If the document is negotiable, as it almost always will be,
there can be no doubt that, so long, as the document remains out-
standing and either in the bank's possession or for twenty-one
days after the bank has turned it over to the buyer, ""- the bank's
interest will prevail over any other competing interest (except
that of a purchaser to whom the document is duly negotiated).
If the bank is reimbursed before it turns over the document,
no priority trouble can arise. But suppose the bank, without
having been reimbursed, turns over the document with the inten-
tion of reserving a security interest in the document (and the
goods after the document has been surrendered) until paid. There
is no difficulty under 9-312 (3) about the bank's interest having
been perfected before the debtor receives the goods. But must
the bank, before the document has been surrendered, give a 9-
312 (3) notification to all secured parties who have filed or who
are otherwise known to the bank? The filed interest might be
held either by a party who claims all the debtor's property under
a blanket after-acquired property clause or by the debtor's regu-
lar inventory financer who (if he is not notified of the bank's
interest) might well be induced to make a new advance on the
incoming stock. Unfortunately 9-304, which establishes the docu-
mentary interest, makes no cross-reference to 9-312(3).11 Nor
'" See note io5 supra.
1. Section 9-312(1) provides: "The rules of priority stated in the following
sections shall govern where applicable: . . . Section 9-304 on goods covered by
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is there anything in 9-312 (3) which seems to exempt from the
notification requirement the holder of any purchase money in-
terest, however acquired. The answer to the riddle may not be
entirely clear, but the bank will be well advised to follow the rule:
when in doubt, file (and notify). Thus banks which, under pre-
Code law, have carried on the familiar sequence of a letter of
credit followed by a trust receipt, should, in shifting over to
operations under the Code, both file and notify parties who are
already on file.
C. Purchase Money Priority in Proceeds
It is possible that the 9-312(3) priority applies only to the
inventory itself and not to the proceeds which result when the
inventory has been sold.1 3 When the proceeds come into exist-
ence, the special purchase money priority, it can be plausibly
argued, vanishes and priorities between parties with conflicting
security interest in the proceeds would be governed (in the usual
case) by the "first to file" rule of 9-312(5), 1 except as to a
purchaser of chattel paper or instruments entitled to priority
under 9-3o8 or 9-3o9. If what has just been said is true, the
purchase money man's hard-won priority over "conflicting" in-
terests does not survive the moment of sale: at that point any
earlier filer (apart from special priorities under 9-3o8 or 9-309)
would resume his "normal" priority over the interest perfected
by a later filing. Thus an: after-acquired property interest would,
as to accounts resulting from the sale of inventory, win over the
inventory financer who had put up the money to finance its
purchase.
Since an inventory financer normally expects to be paid (and
should be paid) from the proceeds, the result suggested in the
preceding paragraph seems to be completely wrong and should be
avoided if humanly possible."15 The result depends on the con-
documents . . . ." Section 9-312(1) apparently means that the rules stated in any
of the sections listed prevail over any of the rules stated in 9-312. (See note ior
supra.) The reference to 9-304, however, does not seem to carry the bank beyond
the documentary stage, during which in any case its priority seems to be assured.
113 See Coogan, supra note go, at 878 n.134.
114 See note ioi supra.
1I The present author has no memory that the question of limiting the purchase
money priority to the inventory itself was ever discussed in the course of drafting
9-312(3). If the question was never raised, the present author (in his capacity as
a draftsman) is to be censured for not having raised it. If the question was raised
and the present author agreed that the priority should be so limited, he is to be
censured for not having opposed the limitation. If the question was raised and
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struction to be given the term "inventory collateral" in the pre-
amble to 9-312 (3): "inventory" is "goods," held for sale or lease;
chattel paper, accounts or what not, whatever their origin, are
clearly not "goods," hence not "inventory," hence not within
9-312(3). This is fair enough, but an argument contra is also
possible. Thus: the accounts or chattel paper are not, of course,
goods; they are intangibles. From another point of view, they
are "proceeds": money claims which result from the sale of goods
on credit. "Proceeds" is not one of the categories into which
Article 9 initially subdivides all personal property; it is a term
which is introduced at a later point in the Article 11 and used for
the purpose of explaining to what property an inventory financer's
security interest shifts when the original collateral is disposed of.
Priorities in the proceeds themselves are regulated in 9-3o6(5),
9-3o8, and 9-3o9. The perfected purchase money security in-
terest in the inventory, which is given priority over "conflicting"
interests under 9-312(3), continues perfected in the resulting
proceeds, as stated in 9-306(3). There is nothing in 9-312(3)
(except the use of the term "inventory collateral") which sug-
gests that priorities established at the inventory stage should be
reversed at the proceeds stage. Indeed, it is the general philosophy
of the Article that priorities, once established, are not reversed.
There is no great difficulty in construing the term "inventory
collateral" to mean "inventory collateral including proceeds." If
that is done the conclusion follows that the 9-312(3) priority
carries over to the proceeds (unless displaced by a new priority
under 9-3o8 or 9-309) 1 7 If the argument just outlined is ac-
cepted, there is only one remaining difficulty: the notification
mechanism of 9-312(3) requires the purchase money party to
notify all parties who have filed financing statements covering "the
same items or type of inventory." Assume that A has been financ-
ing debtor X's receivables, and has filed a financing statement
covering accounts but not inventory. If B, who now comes in as a
purchase money financer of X's inventory, is to get priority over
the present author opposed the limitation but was defeated, he is still to be
censured for not having opposed the limitation more effectively.
"1 Subsection (i) of 9-306 defines the term "proceeds."
11 Since the statutory text is ambiguous, the only way either the inventory
man or the receivables man can be sure of having priority over the other is to
get a subordination agreement from him. Whether, apart from contractual sub-
ordination, the inventory man or the receivables man should have priority may
be a debatable question of policy. What is not debatable is that Article 9, once
the policy issue has been resolved, should state a clear rule one way or the other.
An amendment to the Article is clearly needed.
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A not only as to the inventory but also as to the accounts, he
should be required to notify A: if he does not notify A and A is in-
duced to make new value advances on the resulting accounts (as
he probably will under the usual revolving credit arrangement), A
should win. If he does notify A, the situation resembles the "wild-
eyed hypothetical" discussed a few pages back: A and B had bet-
ter sit down and talk things over.
VI. COLLATERAL OTHER THAN INVENTORY
Section 9-312 (4) provides:
A purchase money security interest in collateral other than in-
ventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same
collateral if the purchase money security interest is perfected at
the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within
ten days thereafter.
x. Scope of 9--312(4).- Although the subsection sounds as
if it covered a great deal of ground, there are only a few situations
in which it will have any effect. Other sections, which prevail
over 9-312(4), deal with priorities in goods which become
fixtures (9-313) or which are installed in or affixed to other goods
(9-314) or which are commingled in a product (9-315). Farm
products which are grown or raised by the debtor (such as crops
or the increase of a herd of livestock) cannot become the sub-
ject matter of a purchase money interest, since the secured party's
loan does not go directly into their purchase price. Nor could
such intangibles as accounts, contract rights, chattel paper, or
instruments normally be acquired by the debtor in a purchase
money transaction. "Collateral other than inventory" thus comes
down to equipment (other than fixtures and accessions), consumer
goods (other than fixtures and accessions), farm products which
are purchased by a farmer (for example, a new herd of livestock),
and (but this is almost on a hypothetical level) general intangibles.
2. Conflicting Security Interests. - As we pointed out in our
discussion of 9-312 (3) there are two types of interest with which
the purchase money interest may "conflict": after-acquired
property interests and new value interests which do not technically
qualify as purchase money interests under the 9-107 definition.
Section 9-204(4) (b) in effect rules out after-acquired property
interests in consumer goods (other than accessions), so that, with
respect to such goods, the only "conflicting" interests which can
be imagined are two new value interests, of which one qualifies
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as a purchase money interest while the other does not (the con-
sumer debtor has fraudulently induced two lenders to make loans
against his new car, television set, or what not).
Most of the pre-Code priority litigation in this area had to do
with equipment and consumer goods which had become (or were
assumed to have become) fixtures. We may assume that this will
continue to be true under Article 9, so that the great bulk of the
cases will fall under 9-313 on fixtures and not under 9-312 (4).
The principal novelty under the Code will be that the dividing
line between fixtures and loose property will become more im-
portant, since the conditions of priority are not identical under
9-312(4) and 9-313.118 In pre-Code litigation the dividing line
was not sharply or clearly drawn; the Code is not, in this respect,
necessarily an improvement.
3. Notification. - Unlike 9-312(3) on inventory, subsection
(4) does not require the purchase money party to notify other
secured parties of his interest. Thus the competing interests
which may be subordinated to the purchase money interest do
not receive the useful warning to which they are entitled in the
inventory case. The comment briefly remarks that "since an
arrangement for periodic advances against incoming property is
unusual outside the inventory field, no notification requirement is
included in subsection (W)." This may well be true, but the situa-
tion of the secured party who makes optional or obligatory "fu-
ture advances" is worth considering. In general the future ad-
vance lender is given priority (under 9-312 (5)) over lenders who
make intervening advances. That is to say, if A makes an ad-
vance (to be secured by all the debtor's property) on February
I, B makes a similar advance on March i, and A makes a second
advance on April i, A has priority over B not only as to the
February i advance but as to the April i advance. The rule of
9-312(5) is, however, expressly made subordinate to the rules
stated in the other subsections of 9-312. Thus if B's March i
advance gave him a purchase money interest, which he perfects,
A would be subordinated, with respect to the property subject to
the purchase money interest, as to both the February i and April
i advances. It is not suggested that this result is wrong, but it is
clear that A cannot make his April i advance with any assurance
that 9-312 (5) gives him priority over security interests which
represent intervening advances. Nor can he tell by checking the
files whether any such security interests are entitled to the pur-
1s For the conditions of priority under 9-313 see Part VII infra.
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chase money priority: a financing statement on file would not in
all probability disclose the fact that a purchase money interest
was involved. He can inquire from parties who have filed financ-
ing statements against his debtor whether they claim purchase
money interests, and while no provision of Article 9 expressly re-
quires such parties to answer such an inquiry, it is reasonable to
assume that they will give the requested information. (But of
course the fact that B thinks he has a purchase money interest
does not necessarily mean that he has one.) The upshot of the
discussion is that a lender, before agreeing to make future ad-
vances, should ponder the possible effect of 9-312 (4).
4. The Grace Period for Perfection. - The one condition for
priority under 9-312 (4) is that the purchase money interest be
perfected "at the time the debtor receives possession of the col-
lateral or within ten days thereafter." The meaning of "receives
possession" has been discussed in connection with 9-312(3).119
Under subsection (3) the purchase money interest, to be entitled
to the priority, must be perfected not later than the time the
debtor receives possession; under subsection (4) there is an ad-
ditional ten-day grace period for perfection. The history of the
ten-day provision is curious. In pre-1956 drafts, the grace
period was allowed both for inventory and noninventory in-
terests. In the 1956 recommendations the grace period was
abolished for both types of interest (so that the condition for
priority under both subsection (3) and subsection (4) was per-
fection "at the time the debtor receives possession of the col-
lateral"). In the 1958 draft the grace period was restored to sub-
section (4) (but not to subsection (W)) with the explanation that
"the change . . . conforms to the business practice of filing
after delivery in cases of purchase money security interests in
collateral other than inventory." 120 Thus, if the debtor insists
that he must have the goods today, the purchase money financer
can deliver them, without sacrificing his 9-312 (4) priority, pro-
vided he perfects within the following ten days.
Section 9-30I(2) also gives a ten-day grace period for filing
with respect to purchase money interests; if the purchase money
secured party files within ten days after the debtor comes into
possession of the collateral, "he takes priority over the rights of a
transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the
time the security interest attaches and the time of filing." Under
9-301 (2), filing during the grace period does not give protection
"x See p. 1378 supra.
121 Section 9-312, comment (Supp. 1958), at 17.
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against pre-filing buyers and purchasers (other than transferees
in bulk) who buy or purchase without actual knowledge of the
purchase money interest. When 9-3 12 (4) is added to 9-301 (2),
the purchase money party who files during the grace period is
protected not only against bulk transferees and lien creditors but
against the class of "purchasers" who hold competing or "con-
flicting" security interests. The 9-312 (4) grace period can lead
to results which may seem, at least superficially, odd. Assume that
fraudulent debtor X induces both A and B to make advances on
the security of a new machine which X is about to acquire; neither
A nor B is aware of the other's presence and each expects to end
up with a purchase money interest in the machine. Whether
either of them does depends on whether X uses the funds ad-
vanced to pay the purchase price. Assume that X uses A's money:
A now has the purchase money interest and B, although he has
given new value, does not. If A files within ten days after X
gets the machine, 9-3 12 (4) gives him priority over B even though
B has filed first or A otherwise learns of B's interest before his
own filing. Indeed, since the 9-312(4) priority appears to be
absolute, A would win even though he had known at the time of
making his loan that B had also made a loan with the expectation
of acquiring a purchase money interest. (If it appeared that A
had somehow conspired with X for the purpose of defrauding B,
there might be an action in tort in favor of B, but the chances of
winning such an action would probably not seem bright to many
lawyers.) Of course, the unhappy situation just discussed exists
under Article 9 without regard to the 9-312(4) grace period: a
parallel case can be put under 9-312 (3) between two inventory
financers, but the grace period aggravates the situation.
VII. FixTuREs
Section 9-313 deals with priorities between chattel security
interests in fixtures and interests in the real estate of which the
fixtures have, conceptually, become a part.'- The section is not
12' The most notable contribution to the study of the Article 9 treatment of
fixtures, under 9-313 and related sections, is Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319 (1962). Mr. Coogan
concludes, after having established an irrefutable case, that 9-313 is seriously de-
fective in several respects and should be redrafted in connection with a recon-
sideration of the entire fixture problem. Mr. Coogan does not dispute the policy
which 9-313 was designed to carry out; his quarrel is with the method adopted to
achieve the desired result and his point is that the subject of fixtures is a good
deal more complicated than the draftsmen of 9-3x3 conceived it to be. One part of
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restricted to purchase money interests. However, the financing
of fixtures has traditionally been carried out on a purchase money
basis: a nonpurchase money interest in fixtures, even if it were
theoretically possible, has never been known under pre-Code law.
While 9-313 is broadly drafted to cover any type of security in-
terest which may attach to goods which are or become fixtures,
there can be no doubt that the interests involved will be, in fact,
purchase money interests, of the type which under pre-Code law
were evidenced by conditional sale contracts and purchase money
mortgages. We are thus justified in treating 9-313 as a special
instance- indeed, the most important single instance - of the
general rule of purchase money priority. The only practical im-
portance of the fact that 9-313 is not technically restricted to
purchase money interests seems to be this: the holder of the fix-
ture security interest does not have to show, as a condition of his
priority, that he has a "purchase money security interest" under
9-107; that is, if he is a lender, as distinguished from a seller, he
does not have to show that his funds were "in fact . . . used" to
pay the purchase money.
122
A. The Importance of Bolts and Screws in the Code
i. The Distinction Between Goods Merged in and Separable
From the Real Estate. - In general 9-313, adopting the majority
rule under pre-Code law, gives priority to the chattel interest over
antecedent interests in the real estate. It has always been assumed
that, even though the basic proposition of priority for the chattel
fixture interest is accepted, there must be a limit beyond which
goods, when incorporated in a structure, so lose their identity that
they become for all purposes part of the real estate, cannot be
separately financed as fixtures, and will automatically feed the
lien of a real estate mortgage. Under pre-Code law this limiting
Mr. Coogan's analysis, which is directly relevant to the question of priorities in
fixtures, is discussed pp. 1394-96 infra.
12 In our discussion of the purchase money priority sections, we considered the
case of two lenders induced by a fraudulent debtor to make advances, each ex-
pecting to receive a purchase money interest in property to be acquired by the
debtor. Which one gets the purchase money interest depends on whose funds the
debtor uses to pay the purchase price; whoever ends up with the purchase money
interest has priority under 9-312(3) and (4). If the hypothetical is reconsidered
in the context of fixtures, it would seem that both the lucky lender who gets the
purchase money interest and his less fortunate colleague are entitled to the 9-313
priority over the real estate interests. As between themselves, priority would
probably continue to be determined under 9-312(4), and the purchase money
interest would win if duly perfected (by filing, since fixtures are involved, with the
real estate records under 9-4ox).
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point was sometimes sought to be located under the formula of
"material injury to the freehold": if removal of goods would
cause ((material injury" they could not be separately financed as
chattels. Justice Holmes once suggested, more directly, that
structural materials - "bricks or beams in a building" - were
the sort of things which could not be divorced from the real es-
tate.123 Section 9-313, abandoning the "material injury to the free-
hold" formula, follows, albeit somewhat verbosely, the Holmes-
ian line:
The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into
a structure in the manner of lumber, brick, tile, cement, glass,
metal work and the like and no security interest in them exists
under this Article unless the structure remains personal property
under applicable law.
The "unless" clause at the end of the sentence is a bow to the odd
cases which hold that a building remains personal property.'24
If it does, then apparently there can be a security interest "under
this Article" even in the structural materials; it does not follow,
however, that, in such a case, the "rules of this section" would
apply, since those rules deal only with real estate interests. The
case would presumably fall under 9-314 on "accessions" or under
the general priority rules of 9-312.
2. The Practical Unimportance of the Distinction. - Given the
infinite variety of situations which the technology of building can
offer for decision, no statutory formula could be devised which
would clearly locate the dividing line between goods which are
to be considered as having been for all purposes swallowed up in
the real estate and those which remain subject to separate financ-
ing as chattels apart from the real estate. Fortunately, under the
approach taken in 9-313, it is not really important to know where
the dividing line is and the Holmesian sentence just quoted is, in
truth, an unnecessary, although harmless, flourish. Under 9-
313(5) the secured party must reimburse any encumbrancer or
owner of the real estate (other than the debtor himself) "for the
cost of repair of any physical injury" to the structure caused by
his removal of the fixtures. Unless his fixtures are of the type
described in the first sentence of 9-313(1), he has a theoretical
right to tear down the structure, if that is the only way in which
122 See p. 1353 supra.
124 See, e.g., Royal Store Fixture Co. v. Patten, 183 Pa. Super. 249, 13o A.2d 271
(1957) (frozen custard stand); Thompson Yards, Inc. v. Bunde, so N.D. 4o8, 196
N.W. 312 (1923) (storage shacks).
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he can remove his property; however, if he does tear down the
structure, 9-313(5) requires him to rebuild it. Thus, without
regard to 9-313(1), 9-313(5) makes it clear that as a practical
matter the only goods as to which the 9-313 priority is worth
having are goods which can be removed without seriously damag-
ing the structure. Thus we need not concern ourselves with re-
fined speculations whether such things as air conditioning sys-
tems and electrical connections built into the walls, removable
only by tearing the walls down, are, or are not, "like" lumber,
brick, tile, and so on.
B. No Code Definition of Fixtures
Like its predecessor, section 7 of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act, 9-313 makes no attempt to determine which goods be-
come fixtures and which do not (except, of course, that the struc-
tural materials described in the first sentence of subsection (i)
are conclusively determined to be fixtures). Apart from these
enumerated materials "the law of this state other than this Act
determines whether and when other goods become fixtures." In
the pre-Code priority litigation in states which adopted the ma-
jority rule (the purchase money interest in fixtures has priority
over an antecedent real estate interest), the distinction between
fixtures and nonfixtures was taken rather lightly: if the purchase
money interest won as to fixtures, it would win, a fortiori, as to
nonfixtures; therefore, for the purposes of the case, the goods,
however loosely attached, could be assumed to be fixtures. In so-
called Massachusetts rule states (where, doctrinally, the priority
was denied) the distinction took on importance as an escape from
the announced rule; by holding, say, oil furnaces not to be fix-
tures, the court could give the purchase money interest the priority
which Massachusetts doctrine apparently denied it.12 5 Article 9
establishes the purchase money priority both as to fixtures and
nonfixtures, so that the distinction might seem to be irrelevant as
to the basic issue even in such a state. There are, however, two
points at which the distinction is important.
i. Importance of the Distinction Between Fixtures and Non-
fixtures. - (a) Conditions of Priority. - The first point goes to
what may be called the conditions of priority. Section 9-3 13 (2)
provides that:
125 For a discussion of the difficulties which 9-313 creates with respect to the
determination of what goods are fixtures in a minority rule state, see p. 1394
infra.
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A security interest which attaches to goods before they become
fixtures takes priority as to the goods over the claims of all per-
sons who have an interest in the real estate except as stated in
subsection (4).
Subsection (4) requires that the security interest be perfected
(i.e., filed) for protection against certain real estate interests
which accrue after the security interest has attached. There is,
therefore, no requirement that the fixture security interest be per-
fected (filed) for protection against real estate interests which
are in existence at the time the security interest attaches; the
priority is automatic and runs in favor of both the unperfected
and the perfected security interest. In not imposing a perfection
requirement with respect to preexisting interests, Article 9 fol-
lows pre-Code law, decisional and statutory, in all the majority
rule states."' If, however, the goods, when attached, do not, un-
der the local law, become fixtures, then the relevant priority sec-
tion of the Code is 9-312(4), not 9-313(2). Under 9-312(4)
there are two conditions for priority which do not exist under
9-313(2) .127 The first is that the interest be technically a pur-
chase money security interest (but it may be safely assumed that
in almost all cases this requirement will be met). The second is
that the security interest be perfected not later than ten days after
the debtor receives possession of the collateral. (It is not clear
why there should be a perfection requirement as to nonfixtures.)
Thus an unperfected interest which will win if the goods are fix-
tures will lose if the goods are not fixtures. Therefore in any
situation where the secured party has failed to perfect within the
9-3 12 (4) ten-day period, it may be anticipated that he will argue
that the goods are fixtures, in order to escape into the safe haven
of 9-3 13 (2), while his opponent (who will be, as the footnote indi-
cates, the holder of a mixed mortgage covering the debtor's real
and personal property) will make the contrary argument. 2 De-
cision will then turn on what the non-Code law of fixtures hap-
126 The idea that the purchase money interest is not subject to filing or
recording requirements as a condition of perfection against preexisting interests
goes back to the first of the nineteenth-century cases which established the pur-
chase money priority in the context of railroad finance. See the quotation from
Justice Bradley's opinion in the New Orleans Railroad case, p. 1339 supra. For
the statutory adoption of the rule see the discussion of UCSA § 7, p. 1359 supra.
127 Section 9-312(4) has been extensively discussed in Part VI supra.
12 It may be assumed that the goods involved are (in Code terminology)
either consumer goods or equipment; in either case, if they are not fixtures, 9-3 12 (4)
applies. They will certainly not be inventory, so that 9-312(3) will not apply.
Of course, if the interest with which the Article 9 security interest competes is
merely an interest in realty, which does not extend to personalty, then the
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pens to be in the forum. The situation has one notably odd aspect:
the pre-Code fixture cases will turn out, almost without excep-
tion, to involve situations in which it has been to the advantage
of the real estate interest to prove that the goods were fixtures;
now, by reason of the curious discrepancy between 9-3 12 (4) and
9-313(2), the roles of the parties are reversed. The law of fix-
tures has never been noted for its consistency; it would be folly
to predict results in the situation now hypothesized. A court con-
vinced of the wisdom of the purchase money priority might be
inclined to throw the case under 9-312 (2); a court which thinks
well of the perfection requirement might incline to the opposite
solution.
(b) Reimbursement for Damage in Removal. - The second
point at which the fixture-nonfixture distinction becomes rele-
vant has to do with the secured party's right of removal. If the
goods are fixtures (but not of the type described in the first sen-
tence of 9-3 13 (1)) he may remove them but must reimburse real
estate encumbrancers "for the cost of repair of any physical in-
jury" to the structure caused by the removal. (Pre-Code law
was not entirely clear on this point, but it seems to have been
generally assumed that there was no such duty of reimbursement:
the right to remove the fixture was absolute, if it existed at all.12 9)
If the goods, although somehow attached to the real estate, are
not fixtures, no provision of the Code requires the secured party
to pay for incidental damage done in removing them: it may be
assumed that there is no such duty. It is easy to imagine cases
where the secured party, to avoid the reimbursement requirement,
can argue plausibly that the goods are not fixtures, while the real
estate encumbrancer can, with equal plausibility, argue that they
are. In this situation, at any rate, the parties occupy their normal
roles, instead of reversing them as in the 9-3 12 (2) to 9-312(4)
switch previously discussed.
priority question under 9-3x2(4) does not arise. The creditor, who holds the real
estate mortgage, could not, in that capacity, defeat an unperfected security in-
terest. He would (9-3oi) have to acquire a lien on the goods, without knowledge
of the security interest and before it was perfected. The situation discussed in the
text will arise, therefore, only when the holder of the real estate mortgage also
claims a security interest in the debtor's personal property -i.e., the standard form
of corporate "mLxed" mortgage which covers all the corporate debtor's assets, real
and personal, with an after-acquired property clause as to the personal property.
Since this type of mortgage is not used with respect to residential property and
since in any event the Code (9-2o4) almost completely invalidates after-acquired
property interests in consumer goods, the text discussion is relevant only with
respect to commercial and industrial (typically corporate) property.
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2. The Inability of "Minority Rule" State Law to Provide an
Adequate Concept of "Fixture." -A recent discussion in this
Review has tellingly pointed out the difficulties of operating the
mechanism of 9-313 in states which did not, before the enactment
of the Code, accept, as a matter of doctrine, the so-called majority
rule of purchase money priority with respect to goods so affixed
to the land or to buildings as to become realty but, nevertheless,
to continue to be severable without causing "material injury to
the freehold." 13 In majority rule states -the rule was some-
times associated with New York and was adopted in section 7 of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act - there was, so to say, a
threefold division of property: straight real property, straight
personal property, and an intermediate class which, although
affixed and thus for most purposes real property, could never-
theless be severed and could thus be separately financed as chat-
tels. In such states the term "fixture," used without definition in
9-3 13 and other sections of Article 9, will cause no great difficulty:
it will be taken to refer to the intermediate class of property
recognized under the pre-Code law, decisional or statutory. On
the other hand, in the minority or Massachusetts rule states, the
situation is quite different. In such states, the pre-Code law
recognized only straight real estate and straight personal property,
without any intermediate class. In such states the term "fixture"
referred to materials which had been wrought into a structure
and could no longer be severed from it. As the Ohio court put
it: "A removable fixture as a term of general application, is a
solecism - a contradiction in words. . . .A fixture is an article
which was a chattel, but which by being physically annexed or
affixed to the realty, became accessory to it and part and parcel of
it." '" We suggested in our earlier discussion that in Massachu-
setts, and no doubt in other states thought to adhere to the
minority rule, the purchase money priority was to a considerable
degree maintained, despite the announced doctrinal position, by
holding that goods, no matter how irrevocably wrought into a
structure, nevertheless remained personal property.132 That is,
goods which in New York were held to be "fixtures" (and there-
fore removable) were held in Massachusetts to be not fixtures but
130 Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 7S HARv. L. RaV. x319 (1962). For a fuller description of the position taken
by Mr. Coogan, see note 12 supra. The author acknowledges his indebtedness to
Mr. Coogan with respect to the ensuing discussion.
"I' Teaff v. Hewitt, x Ohio St. 511, 524, 527 (1853), quoted by Coogan, supra
note x3o, at 1344.
132 The "Massachusetts rule" is discussed pp. 1355-58 supra.
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"personalty" (and therefore removable). The result was the
same but the semantics were curiously different.
The Code has now been adopted (as the UCSA was not) in
such minority rule jurisdictions as Massachusetts and Ohio.
Lawyers in such states now find themselves in the painful situa-
tion of working with a statute which uses the term "fixtures,"
without definition, to mean something quite different from the
meaning of the same term in the state's pre-Code law. To make
matters worse, 9-313 (i) provides that "the law of this state other
than this Act determines whether and when other goods [i.e.,
other than the structural materials referred to in the first sen-
tence of 9-313(1)] become fixtures." In transactions carried out
under Article 9, a good deal turns on whether goods which are in
various ways attached to land and buildings are or are not "fix-
tures." Filing will be made in one place if they are and in another
place if they are not.13 3 And with respect to the priority of pur-
chase money (or new value) interests over after-acquired property
interests, the conditions of priority, as we have seen, are different
under 9-313 from those which apply under 9-312 (4).
If lawyers and judges in states which followed the minority
rule before enactment of the Code turn to their pre-Code prece-
dents to determine what are 9-313 fixtures - as 9-313 itself
invites them to do-the result will be chaos. Section 9-313 is
workable only against the background of the state of law which
existed, pre-Code, in the majority rule states. If 9-313 is not
amended, the only way of avoiding chaos is for the courts to hold
that the enactment of 9-313 also, in some mysterious way, abro-
gated the state's pre-Code case law on what are fixtures and
substituted for it the case law of such a state as New York. This
is asking quite a lot of any court.
3. Amendment of 9-313 as a Solution. - A more plausible
escape from chaos is the amendment of 9-313. It is appropriate
that the demand for a redrafting of the section should have
originated in Massachusetts. One possibility is the inclusion in
9-313 of a statutory definition of "fixtures." The draftsmen of
the section, their thought focused on the majority rule states,
avoided such a definition on the grounds that it was not absolutely
necessary (as it was not in the states they were thinking of) and
'33 Under 9-4oi filing with respect to goods which "are or are to become fix-
tures" is to be made "in the office where a mortgage on the real estate concerned
would be filed or recorded." Filing with respect to goods which are not fixtures or
not meant to become fixtures would be made with separate chattel records, local or
statewide or both. For some of the difficulties posed by the filing provisions see
Coogan, supra note x30, particularly at 1334-38.
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that it would be extremely difficult to draft (as indeed it would
be). Conceivably, reconsideration of the fixture problem will sug-
gest a completely different approach from that now embodied in
9-313 .' 3  If such a different approach is not discovered, the only
solution (at least for the minority rule states) will be the inclusion
of a fixture definition -whose drafting will no doubt prove to
be as difficult as the original draftsmen had anticipated.
C. New Developments in 9-313(3)
z. The Postaffixation Security Interest. -Section 9-313(3)
validates a type of security interest in fixtures which had been,
for all practical purposes, unknown to pre-Code law: that is to
say, an interest which "attaches to goods after they become fix-
tures." Under subsection (3) such an interest is "valid against"
(i.e., has priority over) subsequent interests in the real estate pro-
vided the fixture interest is perfected (filed) before the subsequent
interest attaches or in any event if the subsequent encumbrancer
has knowledge of the fixture interest. However, the postaffixation
security interest
is invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate
at the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not
in writing consented to the security interest or disclaimed an in-
terest in the goods as fixtures [i.e., executed a subordination agree-
ment].
It seems unlikely that there will be many lenders who will be
tempted to experiment under 9-313(3). The subsection might
prove helpful in the odd case where the security interest (because
of delay in executing the security agreement or in the giving of
value) did not, under 9-204, "attach" to the goods until after
they were in place.1
35
2. A Clarification of "Subsequent Purchaser." -Section 7 of
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, like 9-313, required filing as a
"I "Completely different," that is to say, in the mechanism adopted; pre-
sumably the basic policy decision which 9-313 was meant to implement -priority
for the new value chattel interest over prior and subsequent real estate interests-
will not be questioned.
15 As Coogan points out, supra note 13o, at 1333-38, there will be cases in
which at the time a chattel security interest attaches to goods it will not be known
to what land they will subsequently be affixed or, indeed, whether they will ever be
affixed. In such a case a secured party might not learn of a subsequent affixation
until after the goods have become fixtures. If he is at that time required to make
a filing with the realty records (see 9-4oi(i)(b)), the filing will, of necessity, be
made after the affixation. Mr. Coogan, in the passage cited, reviews some of the
problems which arise in this complicatd situation.
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condition of protection against "subsequent purchasers of the
realty." Section 7 did not go into detail on who were "subsequent
purchasers" and there was a fair amount of litigation, particularly
with respect to purchasers at foreclosure sales where the mort-
gage being foreclosed was not itself subsequent to the conditional
sale. 13" Section 9-313(4) supplies the detail which was lacking
in section 7. The subsequent interests to which the unperfected
fixture interest will lose are described in subsection (4) as being
those acquired by purchasers "for value of any interest in the
real estate," creditors with liens "on the real estate . . . ob-
tained by judicial proceedings," and creditors with "a prior en-
cumbrance of record on the real estate to the extent that . . .
[they make] subsequent advances." Such interests prevail
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceed-
ings is obtained, or the subsequent advance under the prior encum-
brance is made or contracted for without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected.
The final sentence of the subsection provides that: "A purchaser
of the real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer
purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser
within this section." Thus a prior mortgagee cannot promote him-
self to the status of "subsequent purchaser" by buying the real
estate on foreclosure, even in the unlikely event that he bought
without knowledge of the fixture interest and on the assumption
that the fixtures were unencumbered.
3. No Solution of the "New for Old" Problem. - Section 9-313
is less helpful on another issue which has given some trouble
under pre-Code law. This is what might be called the "new for
old" issue: l"I on installation of new equipment (subject to the
fixture interest) old equipment (subject to a preexisting mortgage)
is removed. The removal, clearly, is wrongful as to the mortgagee.
An occasional case has suggested that without regard to the rela-
tive values of the new and old equipment, the fixture party's
participation in or knowledge of the wrongful act should strip
him of the priority to which he would otherwise be entitled. Sec-
tion 9-313 ignores the problem, so that the pre-Code precedents
may have a continuing vitality.
4. The Abolition of the New Jersey and Pennsylvania Devia-
tions.- Section 9-313 was drafted with anxious care so as to
make crystal clear that neither the New Jersey Institutional
136 See pp. 1365-66 supra.
137 See pp. 1366-67 supra.
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Doctrine nor the Pennsylvania Plant Mortgage Doctrine was
tenable under the Code."8' Subsection (5) on the right to remove
requires the secured party to reimburse the holders of interests
in the real estate (other than the debtor) "for the cost of repair
of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the
real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by
any necessity to replace them." Thus, the refrigerating units
can be removed from the apartment house, the elevators from the
hotel, the organ from the church, the essential machinery from
the factory: it makes no difference that the institution or enter-
prise, thus crippled, will be unable to carry out its sacred or pro-
fane function. The only condition on the right to remove is the
obligation to repair "physical injury," for which "adequate se-
curity" may be demanded in advance by any party entitled to re-
imbursement; on failure of the fixture party to provide "adequate
security," the party entitled would unquestionably have a right
to a restraining order forbidding the removal until the security
was posted.
D. The Construction Mortgage Exception Under the Code
In our discussion of pre-Code law, the suggestion has been put
forward that the major exception (itself sometimes disguised as a
"minority rule") to the normal priority of the purchase money
interest involved the conflict between such an interest and an-
other substantially contemporaneous new value interest, such as
a construction mortgage. We also noted that section 7 of the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act gave an apparently absolute priority
to the purchase money fixture interest; research revealed no case
in which any court had engrafted a "construction mortgage" ex-
ception on the section 7 priority, although it is also true that no
case was found from which it appeared that the possibility or
desirability of such an exception had been argued to the court."3 9
Article 9, both in the purchase money priority subsections of 9-312
and in the fixture provisions of 9-313, follows section 7 in giving
an apparently absolute priority to the purchase money or fixture
interest. Indeed, as we have pointed out more than once, in a
contest between two contemporaneous new value interests, Article
9 seems to award the priority to the one that happens to qualify
138 on the New Jersey doctrine, see pp. 136o-6i supra; on the Pennsylvania
doctrine, pp. 1361-63 supra.
139See Greene v. Elkins, 134 Misc. 118, 235 N.Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1929),
digested in note 86 supra and accompanying text.
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technically as the purchase money interest under the not uncom-
plicated language of 9-107.
If the Article is taken as it reads, there seems to be no chink
through which the common law exception can creep to establish
itself. And yet the exception seems to have much merit. Presum-
ably the policy which underlies the rule of purchase money
priority is that the "new money" should win over the "old money"
because the new money has financed the acquisition of property
which was never part of the original security, which was not
counted on by the old money interest, and which will increase
the earning power of the debtor enterprise. The case for prefer-
ring the purchase money interest becomes manifestly less compel-
ling when both the competing interests have put up "new money";
when it appears that the property involved was supposed to be
the security for the loan which is not technically the purchase
money loan; when, finally, the result of following the normal
priority rule may be to leave the nonpurchase money interest
either with no security at all or with security which would never
have supported the loan if the true situation had been known. 4 '
A bank which makes a construction loan can (and should) pro-
tect itself against the diversion of its funds and the threat of un-
paid suppliers with purchase money claims by hold-back arrange-
ments under which the loan will be paid down in installments as
the construction progresses, with the final installment not due
until completion. But bondholders represented by an inactive
trustee are in no position to look after their own interests; nor
are the passive investors in the several types of real estate syndi-
cation which became popular during the 1950's, some of which
bore a suspicious resemblance to the trickier methods of high
finance which were practiced during the i92o'S.1
4
Section 1-103 of the Code provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the
principles of law and equity ... estoppel, fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or
invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
This amiable truism must have some meaning. We have often
been reminded that a bankruptcy court and, perhaps to an even
140 If the Code authorities undertake a reconsideration of the Article 9 fixture
treatment (see note 121 supra and text at p. 1395), the merits of the "construc-
tion mortgage" exception to the rule of purchase money priority might well be
taken into account.
141 For an excellent description of the syndication practices, see Berger, Real
Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need for Protection, 69 YALE:
L.J. 725 (xg6o).
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greater extent, a reorganization court is a court of equity, with
broad powers and flexible procedures. The priority provisions of
the Code seem in general to have been soundly conceived. In an
appropriate case a court with equity powers might well look to
the spirit of the Code, which is generous, instead of to its letter,
which is occasionally rigid and restrictive.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At the outset of our discussion we proposed to review the
Article 9 provisions on the purchase money priority in the light
of an historical inquiry into the case-law origins of the priority.
From the confrontation of Code and pre-Code law, we may con-
clude that the Article 9 treatment of the problem, while soundly
inspired, was not entirely successful in its detail. There is diffi-
culty with section 9-313 on fixtures, particularly in states which
adhered to the minority rule before enactment of the Code. There
are unexplained and unexplainable discrepancies between the
conditions for priority under the fixture section and under the
general priority rules of 9-312. There is doubt whether the pur-
chase money priority in inventory under 9-312 (3) does, or does
not, carry over to the proceeds. The definition of "purchase
money security interest" in 9-107 has elements of artificiality:
the draftsmen might have been better advised if they had aban-
doned this technical construct altogether.
It is easy to exaggerate the importance of these and other de-
fects. We have a long history of living with imperfect statutes,
which the courts have gradually construed into a sort of sense.
Indeed the statutory imperfections themselves may have their
uses: the ambiguities, the contradictions, the unresolved or im-
perfectly perceived issues of policy facilitate the performance by
the courts of their necessary task of making yesterday's statute
responsive to today's needs. There is no reason to anticipate any
more difficulty in living with these and other provisions of Article
9 - or of the Code as a whole - than there has been in living
with some of the more obscure provisions of the Negotiable In-
struments Law, the Uniform Sales Act, or the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act.
One of the most difficult problems which the sponsors of the
Code must face is what to do about the defects which have been,
and will continue to be, revealed in its structure by analytical
study and by experience in Code states. While the Code is still
pending legislation in many states there is a natural temptation
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on the part of its supporters to play down its minor vices and to
trumpet forth its major virtues. The present author strongly sup-
ports the enactment of the Code in all states: with all faults, it is
a considerable improvement over the pre-Code law in any state.
It may be hoped that within the next few years most or all of
the non-Code states will adopt the Code. At that point it may
become possible to consider the problem of what to do about the
Code's defects with fewer political overtones than now make
themselves heard.
The history of uniform legislation in this country suggests that
the amendment of uniform acts, once they have been widely
passed, is extremely difficult to control. No amendments to the
N.I.L. were ever proposed by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws: the N.I.L. itself, however,
was widely amended state by state. Indeed, so many states
amended so many sections of the N.I.L. in so many different ways
that only by courtesy could that celebrated statute be referred to
as a Uniform Act. The N.I.L. experience tells us that, if the
Code sponsors do nothing to remedy defects, the states will take
on the job themselves, with results which may range from the
untoward to the disastrous.
Amendment of a complicated statute is a complicated process,
not to be undertaken lightly. Our discussion of the purchase
money priority problem has, it is hoped, shown that amendment
of Article 9 in this respect will not be a Saturday afternoon's job
for a hastily assembled committee. In the drafting of statutes
there is a constant temptation to plug up the holes, as they are
discovered, by adding new language. In the process the statute
becomes verbose and incomprehensible. Simplicity and accuracy
take a great deal of time. It would be desirable that, over the
next several years, a serious study of the Code be undertaken with
a view to recommending uniform amendments of the present offi-
cial text. Such a project, appropriately publicized by the spon-
sors, might well preserve the Code from the fate which overtook
the N.I.L. The worst things that could happen would be for the
official Code line to become that the Code is the one perfect
statute which the world has seen or, alternatively, for the sponsors
to respond to ad hoc criticisms with ad hoc amendments. The
pretense of perfection is perhaps absurd enough to be harmless.
The real harm can be done by the overready provision of over-
simplified solutions to underanalyzed problems.
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